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 People’s emotional reactions often depend on probability. However, it is unknown 
whether children consider probability when inferring other people’s emotions. Across three 
papers, this dissertation shows that children (N = 1465) and adults (N = 481) use probabilistic 
information when inferring emotions and that this ability develops with age. Chapter Two 
examined whether children use probability when inferring other people’s surprise (four 
experiments). When inferring who would be surprised about getting a red gumball, 7-year-olds 
inferred that the person who had a lower chance of receiving a red gumball would be surprised, 
but younger children did not. Six-year-olds’ surprise inferences improved when they were 
prompted to consider probability, but not when prompted to consider others’ prior beliefs. 
Together, the findings from this chapter show development in children’s ability to use 
probability to infer surprise. Chapter Three examined whether children and adults use probability 
when inferring other people’s happiness (five experiments). When judging the quality of an 
outcome of two yummy and two yucky gumballs, by age 4, children judged that this outcome is 
better if it came from a gumball machine that contained mostly yucky gumballs than if it came 
from a machine that contained mostly yummy gumballs. However, it is not until age 5 that they 
also recognize that people would be happier with this outcome if it came from the former 
machine rather than the latter machine. Together, the findings from this chapter show 
development in children’s ability to use probability to infer happiness and a developmental lag 
between children’s assessments of quality and happiness. Chapter Four examined whether 
children and adults consider close counterfactual alternatives (that are manipulated through 
probability) when inferring other people’s happiness and whether they recognize that an event 
had a close counterfactual alternative (four experiments). When inferring a person’s happiness 
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about choosing a regular balloon (on a blind choice) from ten closed boxes, 6-year-olds inferred 
that the person would be happier if they later learned that most of the remaining boxes also held 
regular balloons than if they mostly held special balloons. However, when asked explicitly about 
the counterfactual alternative, they did not recognize that a special balloon could have easily 
been obtained when most of the boxes contained them. Younger children did not make either 
inference. Children’s happiness inferences improved when extra cues were provided, such that 5- 
and 6-year-olds inferred that a person would be happier when they later learned that they had 
been physically close to many regular balloons compared to when they were physically close to 
many special balloons. Six-year-olds also acknowledged that the special balloon was a close 
counterfactual alternative when the special balloons were physically close and more numerous. 
Together, the findings from this chapter show that children either infer happiness without 
considering close counterfactual alternatives, or that counterfactuals influence children’s 
happiness inferences before they can explicitly acknowledge their closeness. As a whole, this 
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Chapter One: General Introduction 
 Probability influences people’s emotions. For example, say your friend won $100 from a 
contest. You would probably infer that she would be extremely surprised about her win if 500 
other people had entered the contest. However, you would infer that she would not be very 
surprised if only one other person had entered the contest. Similarly, you might infer that your 
friend would be much happier about winning in the former scenario rather than the latter, as her 
chances of winning were initially low and so she might be pleasantly surprised. Thus, the same 
outcome can elicit different emotions or degrees of an emotion depending on the chances of that 
outcome occurring.  
The ability to infer others’ emotions is crucial for successful social interactions. Knowing 
how and why someone feels a particular way allows us to explain their past behaviors, predict 
their future actions, and even helps us regulate our own behaviors. Similarly, failing to correctly 
infer others’ emotions can impair our ability to empathize with or to appropriately comfort them. 
These abilities are especially important in childhood because difficulties in emotion attribution 
could significantly disrupt children’s social interactions and interfere with their ability to form 
friendships. As such, it is important to investigate the factors that children use when inferring 
people’s emotions. This dissertation investigates one such factor that has been mostly neglected 
in the developmental literature – namely, whether children consider probabilistic information 
when inferring other people’s emotions. 
 Before examining whether children integrate their understanding of probability with their 
understanding of emotions, it is important to know what children understand about each of these 
concepts individually, and whether adults consider probability in their emotion inferences. As 
such, in this chapter, I first discuss infants’ and young children’s ability to engage in 
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probabilistic reasoning and how they use probability in their social interactions. Second, I 
discuss children’s development in emotion understanding and the current theories of how 
children infer emotions. Next, I review the literature on adults’ use of probability when inferring 
surprise and happiness. Finally, I provide an overview of the empirical studies conducted in the 
following chapters. 
What do we know about children’s probabilistic reasoning? 
Numbers and proportions are all around us and we use probability information in our 
daily lives, whether we explicitly recognize it or not. Whether we bring an umbrella to work 
depends on the chances that it will rain. A baseball coach’s decision for his lineup depends on his 
players’ batting averages. A teacher’s decision to accept a student’s excuse might depend on how 
reliable they have been in the past. As such, information about statistics, proportions, and 
probabilities help us navigate the world around us. In fact, even infants are sensitive to this 
information as early as their first year of life (e.g., Denison et al., 2013; Téglás et al., 2007; 
Wellman et al., 2016; Xu & Denison, 2009; Xu & Garcia, 2008). 
In violation-of-expectation (VOE) looking-time paradigms, infants look longer at events 
that they find “surprising” or unexpected. This logic has been applied to study probabilistic 
reasoning in infancy. By 6 months of age, infants will look longer at a sample of 4 yellow and 1 
pink balls than a sample of 4 pink and 1 yellow balls if the sample came from a larger population 
that contained a ratio of 4 pink to 1 yellow balls (Denison et al., 2013). This suggests that they 
expect a sample to reflect its population and that their attention is drawn to samples that violate 
the statistical properties of the population from which it is drawn. Infants can also make the 
reverse inference: when they are presented with five randomly sampled items from a population, 
they expect that the larger population will have similar proportions to the sample (Xu & Garcia, 
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2008). By 12 months of age, infants will look longer when a single minority object exits a 
container than when one of three majority objects exits, demonstrating that they have 
expectations about future single-sampling events based on the initial likelihood of those events 
(Téglás et al., 2007). These findings suggest that infants have an understanding of the statistical 
relationship between a sample and the population that it came from. 
However, infants do not automatically expect that a sample should statistically match its 
population, and in fact, they integrate a number of factors when determining the relationship 
between a sample and a population. When 11-month-old infants are shown that an experimenter 
has a preference or goal for white over red balls and that she is intentionally and not randomly 
sampling, they expect that she will sample white (and not red) balls from a population, even if 
the population has mostly red balls. However, if the experimenter is blindfolded and cannot see 
the population that she is sampling from, then infants expect her to sample mostly red balls, 
matching the population’s distribution (Xu & Denison, 2009). This suggests that even infants are 
sensitive to a number of factors (e.g., preference, visual access) that influence our statistical 
inferences and can use that information to make inferences. 
Infants and young children can also integrate their intuitions about probability with their 
understanding of the social world. When learning from others, infants consider both the sample 
and the sampling process when making inductive generalizations (Gweon et al., 2010). In one 
study, 15-month-old infants saw an experimenter squeak three blue balls after sampling them 
from either a population of mostly blue balls and few yellow balls, or a population of mostly 
yellow balls and few blue ones. When given the chance to play with a yellow ball, infants 
squeezed the yellow ball less when the blue balls were sampled from the latter population 
(Gweon et al., 2010). This suggests that they recognized that the experimenter purposely violated 
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random sampling in the population of mostly yellow balls in order to teach them about which 
toys squeaked. Thus, infants constrained their generalization of the squeaking feature to the blue 
balls when there were few of them in the population but not when they were plentiful. By 20 
months of age, probability influences toddlers’ and preschoolers’ explicit social inferences, such 
as when inferring another person’s preferences (Diesendruck et al., 2015; Kushnir et al., 2010; 
Ma & Xu, 2011). For example, when a person pulls a few duck toys from a box containing duck 
and frog toys, young children infer that the person has a preference for ducks if the box contains 
mostly frog toys, but not if the box contains mostly duck toys (Kushnir et al., 2010). This 
inference relies on probability. Pulling only duck toys from a mostly frog population violates 
random sampling and suggests that the person intentionally chose only duck toys because they 
have a preference or goal for ducks over frogs.  
As a whole, the research discussed in this section shows that young children can use 
sampling behaviour and probabilistic information to make inferences about other people and 
their environment. Given that even infants are sensitive to probability information and that young 
children use it in at least one kind of social inference, it is plausible that children might also use 
probability when inferring emotions. 
What do we know about children’s emotion understanding? 
Children’s emotion understanding is an important aspect of their social cognitive 
development and has been linked with a variety of positive outcomes. For example, children with 
better emotion understanding are more successful in their social interactions (e.g., Cassidy et al., 
1992; McDowell et al., 2000), have fewer anxiety and depressive symptoms (e.g., Rieffe & de 
Rooij, 2012; Rieffe et al., 2007, 2008), and perform better academically (e.g., Jones et al., 2011; 
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Lecce et al., 2011). As such, much research has been devoted to examining the development of 
children’s emotion understanding. 
Children are exposed to and experience emotions from birth and their emotion 
understanding develops rapidly throughout childhood. At 3 months of age, infants can recognize 
and differentiate smiling from frowning faces (Barrera & Maurer, 1981), and at 5 months, they 
can distinguish between happy and sad vocalizations (Walker-Andrews & Lennon, 1991). Their 
ability to differentiate between emotions continues to develop until the toddler years when they 
are able to recognize and name basic emotions such as happiness, sadness, fear, and anger (e.g., 
Bullock & Russell, 1985; Denham, 1986; Hughes & Dunn, 1998). Around age 3 to 4, children 
begin to understand how external causes can affect other people’s emotions (e.g., Barden et al., 
1980; Borke, 1971; Harris et al., 1987), and by age 6, they can appreciate that people’s emotions 
depend on their desires and beliefs (e.g., Hadwin & Perner, 1991; Harris et al., 1989). By age 8, 
children develop more complex understandings of emotions such as the understanding that 
people can have multiple or mixed emotions toward one situation (e.g., Donaldson & 
Westerman, 1986; Kestenbaum & Gelman, 1995). While the development of emotion 
understanding is important as a whole, this dissertation focuses specifically on children’s 
inferences of other people’s emotions.  
There are currently two leading accounts of how children infer emotions. One account 
proposes that children infer emotions by relying on memorized scripts (e.g., Barden et al., 1980; 
Gove & Keating, 1979; Harris et al., 1987; Hughes et al., 1981; Widen & Russell, 2010, 2011; 
also see Fehr & Russell, 1984). Scripts are knowledge structures consisting of sequences of 
specific, concrete events (e.g., Abelson, 1981; Schank & Abelson, 1975) that allow people to 
follow social conventions and to reason about common events. For example, our ability to order 
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food at a restaurant depends on our having learned a script outlining the sequence of events that 
unfolds when ordering at a restaurant (waiter brings menu, customer decides what to order, 
customer tells waiter, waiter tells cook; Abelson, 1981). Applied to children’s understanding of 
emotions, the script theory suggests that with development, children come to learn the 
antecedents of particular emotions. Once these scripts are learned, children can use them to infer 
other people’s emotions. For example, children may learn the script that people are happy when 
they receive presents. When they are going to a friend’s birthday party, they know that their 
friend will receive gifts, so they can predict that their friend will be happy (e.g., Widen & 
Russell, 2011). 
Another account suggests that children infer emotions by considering people’s mental 
states, like their desires, beliefs, and goals (e.g., Harris, 2008; Lagattuta, 2005, 2008; Rieffe et 
al., 2005; Skerry & Spelke, 2014; Wellman & Banerjee, 1991; Wellman & Bartsch, 1988). By 
the age of 2, children consider people’s desires and whether or not those desires are fulfilled to 
infer whether they will be happy or sad. For example, children predict that a boy who is 
searching for his dog will be happy if he finds it, but sad if he does not (Wellman & Woolley, 
1990). With age, children also begin to consider people’s beliefs when inferring their emotions, 
though the age at which they do so varies across emotions. For example, at around age 5, 
children start to consider people’s beliefs to infer whether they will be happy or sad (e.g., 
Hadwin & Perner, 1991; Harris et al., 1989). They predict that a boy who likes candy will be 
happy if he believes a box contains some, even if the box has no candy and the actual contents 
are undesirable to him (Hadwin & Perner, 1991). As they get older, children also consider 
people’s beliefs when inferring their surprise (age 7, MacLaren & Olson, 1993; Ruffman & 
Keenan, 1996) and fear (age 6 or 7, e.g., Bradmetz & Schneider, 1999; Ronfard & Harris, 2014). 
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It is easy to think about how the script and theory of mind accounts work for simple 
scenarios like “getting presents makes people happy”. But how do we infer the subtler and more 
sophisticated parts of people’s emotional lives? How do we infer the degree of people’s 
emotions? Or deal with instances where people have the same desires or goals and experience 
identical events but do not feel the same emotion? What do we do when multiple cues to 
emotions are at play? It is harder to imagine how these theories can account for these more 
complex cases. This raises the question of what other factors matter for emotion cognition.  
One element of our more general reasoning abilities that may play a role is probabilistic 
or statistical reasoning. Information about probability influences children’s learning and 
inferences in many areas of non-social and social reasoning. For example, young infants use 
transitional probability to segment continuous streams of speech syllables into words, non-
linguistic auditory sequences into ‘tone words’, and strings of visual shapes into pairs (Aslin et 
al., 1998; Kirkham et al., 2002; Saffran et al., 1996; Saffran et al., 1999). Preschoolers make 
statistical inferences and consider the sampling processes that generate the labels of objects when 
generalizing novel words (Xu & Tenenbaum, 2007a, 2007b). They also use and combine 
information about prior probability and the conditional probability of events to make judgments 
about causation (Gopnik & Schulz, 2004; Gopnik et al., 2001; Sobel et al., 2004). While less 
work has examined how children’s probabilistic reasoning matters in the social world, previous 
work has shown that when learning from others, infants consider both the sample and the 
sampling process when making inductive generalizations (Gweon et al., 2010), and young 
children consider probabilistic information when making explicit inferences about people’s 
preferences (e.g., Kushnir et al., 2010; Ma & Xu, 2011). As such, statistical and probabilistic 
reasoning may also play a role in children’s emotion cognition. 
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In fact, reasoning about statistics and probability may be well suited for understanding 
the more sophisticated, unpredictable, and complex aspects of people’s emotional lives. 
Information about probability can help us infer the degree of emotion someone feels and can 
help explain why two people can have similar mental states and experience identical outcomes in 
a situation, and still feel differently. For example, if somebody receives a positive outcome, they 
might feel happier about it if there was a low prior probability of the outcome occurring 
compared to a high prior probability. Similarly, two people who have the same desires and 
experience the exact same outcomes may feel differently depending on their initial chances of 
receiving that outcome. Further, there are instances where we do not have access to other 
people’s mental states or cases where people struggle with theory of mind reasoning (e.g., 
individuals with autism), so being able to consider other factors like probability to infer emotions 
can be beneficial. Thus, the current dissertation investigates the development of children’s ability 
to use probability information when inferring other people’s emotions, specifically, people’s 
surprise and happiness. 
Examining the development of children’s ability to integrate their understandings of these 
two seemingly independent concepts will broaden our knowledge of human cognition and will 
provide us with a more extensive understanding of children’s emotion inferences. Using 
probability to infer emotions cannot be fully accounted for by memorizing scripts or mental state 
reasoning, so if children use probability to infer emotions, theories about children’s inferences of 
emotions should be revised to account for factors like probability. Specifically, theories of 
emotion should be able to account for the numerous, complex, and sometimes divergent cues that 
people encounter in the social world, and how they integrate these multiple cues to accurately 
infer others’ emotions. A recently proposed framework for studying how people reason about 
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emotions may do just this (Ong et al., 2015, 2019). Using a computational, lay theory approach, 
this framework examines how people reason and combine information from multiple sources to 
infer emotions and how people use domain-general processes (similar to other forms of cognition 
and social cognition) to reason about emotion. This intuitive theory framework of emotion may 
be fruitful for integrating probabilistic reasoning into children’s conceptions of emotion. I will 
return to this point in the General Discussion. 
Adults use probability to infer emotions 
 While classic work with adults has examined how probability information influences 
emotion inferences (e.g., Bell, 1985; Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; Kahneman & Varey, 1990; 
Mellers et al., 1997; Meyer et al., 1997), there is still much to be learned. In this section, I give a 
brief summary of such work with adults and discuss how the findings from the current 
dissertation could add to this literature. 
 The intuitive view of surprise is that it arises when unexpected events occur, and that 
expectations can be conceptualized in terms of probabilities (Meyer et al., 1997; Teigen & 
Keren, 2003). An unlikely event is surprising, but a likely event is not. Adults infer surprise in 
this way. For example, when asked to make probability and surprise judgments about an 
occurrence of rainfall, adults are more surprised when the probability of rain was low compared 
to high (Maguire et al., 2011). They also make this inference for others. When judging how 
surprising it would be for someone to catch their connecting flight after their first flight was 
delayed, adults say that it would be more surprising if the person initially only had a 40% chance 
of making it compared to if they initially had a 60% chance (Teigen & Keren, 2002). This 
suggests that adults understand the link between probability and surprise.  
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 Although less intuitive than the connection between probability and surprise, people’s 
happiness can also be influenced by probability. In gambling games, adults are happier about a 
win if their initial chances of winning were low compared to high and are more disappointed 
with a loss if their initial chances of winning were high as compared to low (Mellers et al., 1997; 
van Dijk & van der Pligt, 1997). This difference in happiness towards the same outcome is 
thought to depend on counterfactual reasoning, in which people compare actual outcomes with 
possible alternative outcomes (e.g., Bell, 1985; Loomes & Sugden, 1986; Shepperd & McNulty, 
2002). That is, a positive outcome feels better when a worse alternative outcome was more 
likely, and a negative outcome feels worse when a better alternative outcome was more likely.  
 In the current dissertation, I first examine whether children use probability to infer 
surprise (Chapter Two). This will allow us to examine the development of conceptions of 
surprise, by assessing whether children’s and adults’ conceptions of surprise are similar. Next, I 
examine whether children and adults use probability to infer happiness (Chapter Three) and 
whether these inferences are dependent on counterfactual reasoning (Chapter Four). It may seem 
redundant to investigate these questions with adults because there is existing work on this topic. 
However, the design of the current studies show the odds of events using clear, easily 
enumerable, visual paradigms, which has not been done in the past. Most research with adults 
presented the scenarios in relatively complex vignettes (e.g., Shepperd & McNulty, 2002; van 
Dijk & van der Pligt, 1997), which do not lend themselves as well to clearly quantified 
outcomes. Further, the findings from my studies with children and adults can be compared 





Overview of Dissertation 
The following chapters describe several empirical studies examining children’s (and 
adults’) consideration of probability when inferring others’ emotions. Chapter Two investigates 
the development of 4- to 7-year-old children’s use of probability in inferring surprise and two 
manipulations intended to make the connection between probability and surprise more apparent 
to younger children. In the first three experiments, children saw stories where two characters 
received a red gumball from different gumball machines. One machine contained mostly red 
gumballs and the other machine contained only a minority of red gumballs. Children were asked 
which character was more surprised to get a red gumball. Experiment 1 examines the 
development of children’s ability to use probability when inferring surprise. Experiment 2 
examines whether children’s surprise inferences would improve when the events are 
deterministic and one event is impossible. Experiment 3 looks at whether their surprise 
inferences improve when prompted to consider probability and people’s beliefs. Experiment 4 
replicates the findings of Experiment 3, using a slightly different design in which children 
attributed emotions to a single character. 
Chapter Three investigates the development of 4- to 6-year-old children’s use of 
probability in inferring happiness and the quality of outcomes. In five experiments, children and 
adults saw stories where a girl received two red and two black gumballs from a gumball 
machine. In one condition, the gumball machine contained mostly red yummy gumballs and a 
few black yucky ones. In the other condition, the machine contained mostly black yucky 
gumballs and a few red yummy ones. Children and adults were asked to rate how the girl felt or 
how good the outcome was. Experiments 1 and 2 examine the development of children’s ability 
to consider probability when inferring happiness. Experiment 3 looks at the development of 
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children’s ability to use probability when assessing the quality of an outcome. Experiment 4 
examines the developmental lag between children’s ability to use probability to assess quality 
and happiness. Experiment 5 examines adults’ use of probability when inferring outcome quality 
and happiness.  
Chapter Four further investigates the development of 4- to 6-year-old children’s use of 
probability in inferring happiness, while also asking whether they do so by considering close 
counterfactual alternatives. In four experiments, children and adults saw stories about a girl who 
won a mundane prize. In one condition, the girl later discovered that her odds of winning a better 
prize had been high. In the other condition, the girl later discovered that her odds of winning a 
better prize had been low. Children and adults were asked to rate how the girl felt and were 
asked a question that assessed whether they recognized the closeness of the counterfactual 
alternative of the girl winning the better prize. Experiments 1 and 2 examines whether children 
consider the initial odds of winning a better prize when inferring happiness and whether they 
recognize the closeness of the better prize. Experiment 3 looks at whether children’s judgments 
would improve when additional cues to the closeness of the alternative were provided. 
Experiment 4 examines adults’ consideration of probability and close counterfactual alternatives 






Chapter Two: Children use probability to infer other people’s surprise (Paper One) 
A version of this paper is published: 
Doan, T., Friedman, O., & Denison, S. (2018). Beyond belief: The probability-based notion of 
surprise in children. Emotion, 18(8), 1163-1173. doi: 10.1037/emo0000394 
Probability and surprise go hand in hand – improbable events are surprising, but probable 
ones are not. As the example in Chapter One illustrates, you would infer that your best friend 
would be surprised to win $100 if 500 other people had entered the contest, but not if only one 
other person had entered. This connection between probability and surprise is present in adults’ 
conceptions of surprise, as they attribute surprise to agents who observe improbable outcomes 
(e.g., Maguire et al., 2011; Teigen & Keren, 2003).  
However, it is unknown whether children consider probability when inferring surprise. 
Previous research has not examined this, as most research on children’s understanding of 
surprise relates it to their understanding of others’ beliefs. When children explain why a 
character was surprised by an outcome, 4-year-olds refer to the character’s beliefs, though 3-
year-olds refer to the character’s desires (Wellman & Banerjee, 1991; Wellman & Bartsch, 
1988). For example, 4-year-olds might say a boy is surprised that his grandmother’s house is 
purple because he thought the house would be white, whereas 3-year-olds might say he is 
surprised because he likes purple (Wellman & Banerjee, 1991). Further, 4- and 5-year-olds 
appropriately attribute surprise to characters whose beliefs are not met, but refrain from 
attributing surprise to characters whose desires are not met (Hadwin & Perner, 1991; Wellman & 
Bartsch, 1988). Finally, children who correctly infer another’s beliefs are also better at predicting 
their surprise. For example, when 3- to 8-year-olds judge which of two boxes will surprise a 
puppet, only children aged 5 and up, who correctly infer the puppet’s beliefs about the contents 
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of the boxes, choose the correct box. This finding suggests that in order to understand surprise, 
children must first understand beliefs (MacLaren & Olson, 1993; also see Ruffman & Keenan, 
1996, and Scott, 2017 for conflicting evidence about whether inferring surprise from false belief 
emerges later or earlier in development).  
Children may also use probability to infer surprise. This is plausible, as adults infer 
surprise in this way (e.g., Maguire et al., 2011; Teigen & Keren, 2003). For example, when asked 
to make probability and surprise judgments about an occurrence of rainfall, adults rated their 
surprise as greater when the probability of rain was lower (Maguire et al., 2011). It is important 
to note that such probability-based inferences may not require attributing beliefs. Adult 
participants could have attributed surprise by only considering the probability of rain occurring, 
and without attributing any beliefs to themselves regarding whether it would rain. Thus, belief 
understanding might not be the only requisite for inferring surprise. 
If children also use probability to infer surprise, this will advance knowledge of how 
children understand surprise, and how they infer emotions more broadly. Existing accounts 
suggest that children understand and infer emotions by memorizing scripts or by considering 
others’ mental states (e.g., Barden et al., 1980; Harris et al., 1989, 2016; Wellman & Woolley, 
1990; Widen & Russell, 2010, 2011). Using probability to infer surprise does not fit under either 
theory. Scripts are composed of specific concrete events (e.g., Abelson, 1981), and do not make 
reference to underlying abstract concepts, like probability (for further discussion see Gopnik & 
Meltzoff, 1997, p. 62). Likewise, notions of probability are not included in children’s notions of 
others’ mental states. Hence, if children also use probability to infer surprise, this will reveal 
another method of understanding emotions, as it will show that their understanding of surprise 
depends on their probabilistic reasoning. 
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Investigating whether children use probability when attributing surprise will also advance 
our understanding of probabilistic reasoning in children. Children consider probability 
information from early in development. Infants use probability to guide their own expectations 
and slightly older children use probability in social inferences (e.g., Denison et al., 2013; 
Kushnir et al., 2010; Ma & Xu, 2011; Téglás et al., 2007). If children also use probability to infer 
emotions, this will expand our knowledge of its influence in children’s social cognition. Further, 
investigating how this ability develops could be informative about how children relate and 
integrate concepts from different domains. 
In four experiments, we investigate children’s ability to use probability to explicitly 
attribute surprise to another person. In the first three experiments, children saw stories in which 
two characters received a red gumball from different gumball machines. One machine contained 
mostly red gumballs and the other machine contained only a minority of red gumballs. Children 
were asked which character was more surprised with the outcome. In the fourth experiment, we 
used a slightly different method, in which children attributed emotions to a single character. 
These four experiments investigate the development of children’s use of probability in inferring 
surprise and two manipulations intended to make the connection between probability and 
surprise more apparent to younger children.  
Experiment 1 
 Experiment 1 investigated the development of children’s ability to use probability to infer 
surprise. Children were told stories about two characters at two different gumball machines and 
were asked to choose the character who was more surprised after seeing both characters receive a 
red gumball. To succeed, children had to appreciate that although getting a red gumball was 
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probable for one character, it was improbable for the other character, making the outcome 
surprising.  
Method 
 Participants. One hundred and twenty children participated: 30 4-year-olds (M = 4;7 
[years; months]; range = 4;3 – 4;11; 15 girls), 30 5-year-olds (M = 5;5; range = 5;0 – 5;11; 14 
girls), 30 6-year-olds (M = 6;6; range = 6;0 – 6;11; 13 girls), and 30 7-year-olds (M = 7;4; range 
= 7;0 – 7;11; 13 girls). In all experiments, children were individually tested at schools and 
daycares in the Waterloo Region. Demographic information was not formally collected, but the 
region is predominantly middle-class, and approximately 79% of residents in this region are 
Caucasian, with Chinese and South Asians as the most visible minority. Different children were 
tested in each experiment. This research, submitted under the name, “Social Understanding in 
Children” (ORE#20042), received ethics clearance through the University of Waterloo’s 
Research Ethics Committee.  
 Materials and procedure. All materials in the current experiment and the following 
experiments were shown on a laptop computer. Children were told two stories (2 trials). Each 
story was about two gumball machines. One machine contained many red gumballs and just a 
few black ones (36 red, 4 black), and the other machine contained the reverse distribution (36 
black, 4 red). We used this distribution (9:1) to ensure that children would readily notice that one 
colour was more plentiful than the other (e.g., Denison et al., 2013; Girotto et al., 2016). 
Children were told that the red gumballs are yummy and the black gumballs are yucky. Two 
identical-looking characters, always viewed from behind, then appeared, with each character at 
one machine. The characters were depicted this way to prevent children’s responses from being 
swayed by extraneous factors, such as differences between the characters, or the expressions on 
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their faces. Children were told that both characters wanted a red gumball and were asked a 
comprehension check question to confirm that they understood (i.e., “What colour gumball do 
the girls want?”). The characters pulled the handles of their machines, and each ended up getting 
a red gumball. Children were then asked which character was more surprised. See Figure 1 for a 
sample story and script.  
In the first story, the characters were girls, the gumball machines were coloured green, 
and they appeared side-by-side. In the second story, the characters were boys, the machines were 
coloured orange, and one appeared above the other. We varied these details to prevent children 
from repeating or alternating responses across the stories. The location of the gumball machines 
was counterbalanced across participants, such that for half the children the mostly-red machine 
was on the right in the first story and on the top in the second story, and in the opposite locations 
for the other children. 
If children responded incorrectly to the comprehension check question about which type 
of gumball the characters wanted, the experimenter repeated the information about the tastes of 
the red and black gumballs. When the comprehension check question was asked again, all 
children answered correctly. 
 
Figure 1. Sample slides and script from Experiment 1 (Trial 1). 
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Results and Discussion 
Six children initially responded incorrectly to the comprehension check question about 
which type of gumball the characters wanted (four 4-year-olds; one 5-year-old; one 7-year-old). 
When these children’s data were excluded, our main pattern of results remain the same. Thus, we 
report our analyses with our full sample. 
Of primary interest was whether children are able to use probability to infer the 
characters’ surprise, and whether this ability develops with age; Figure 2 shows children’s mean 
number of correct responses (i.e., choosing the character who was at the machine with fewer red 
gumballs). A Generalized Estimating Equations (GEE) binary logistic regression with age as a 
between-subject factor (4, 5, 6, 7) revealed a significant main effect of age, Wald X2(df = 3, N = 
120) = 13.02, p = .005. Pairwise comparisons revealed that 4-year-olds gave significantly fewer 
correct responses compared to children at all other ages, ps ≤ .019. However, responses did not 
significantly differ between 5-, 6-, and 7-year-olds, ps ≥ .214. 
We then used Wilcoxon sign tests to examine whether children at each age chose the 
correct character more or less than half the time (i.e., whether the scores departed from chance 
score of 1). For these analyses, we summed children’s correct responses across both trials for a 
maximum score of two. Seven-year-olds predominantly chose the correct character (M = 1.43, 
SD = .817), z = -2.60, p =.009, 6-year-olds showed a trend in this direction (M = 1.27, SD = 
.785), z = -1.79, p =.074, 5-year-olds responded at chance (M = 1.17, SD = .874), z = -1.04, p 
=.297, and 4-year-olds predominantly chose the wrong character (M = 0.67, SD = .802), z = -




Figure 2. Mean scores for children’s surprise judgments in Experiment 1. Error bars show ± 1 
standard error of the mean. Dotted line at a score of 1 represents chance performance. 
These findings suggest development in children’s ability to use probability to infer 
another’s surprise. Although 7-year-olds correctly judged that the character with a lower chance 
of getting a red gumball was more surprised (and 6-year-olds trended in this direction), 5-year-
olds did not make systematic judgments, and 4-year-olds incorrectly judged that the character 
with a higher chance of getting a red gumball would be more surprised.  
One possible interpretation of these results is that 4- and 5-year-olds are insensitive to the 
probabilities of the distributions in this experiment. However, this is unlikely, as 4-year-olds 
attributed greater surprise to the character with the more probable distribution, suggesting that 
even these youngest children were sensitive to the differences between the distributions. 
Furthermore, it is unlikely that 4-year-olds mistakenly think that the more probable distribution 
is less likely to yield a red gumball, as previous research suggests that children this age expect 
the majority item in a distribution to be sampled most often (e.g., Denison et al., 2006, 2013; 
Girotto et al., 2016).  
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Another possible explanation for children’s poor performance is that they may not yet 
understand the word “surprise”, or may mistakenly think that it means a positive emotion. Some 
evidence suggests that young children associate surprise with desirable events (e.g., Bartsch & 
Estes, 1997), attribute positive emotions to the word surprise (Russell, 1990), and know that 
achieving a goal results in positive emotions (e.g., Skerry & Spelke, 2014; Wellman & Woolley, 
1990). However, we tested children aged 4 and older, and previous research shows that children 
at these ages do understand “surprise”, and do not just connect it with positive outcomes (e.g., 
Hadwin & Perner, 1991; MacLaren & Olson, 1993; Wellman & Banerjee, 1991). For example, 
4-year-olds explain surprise by referring to agents’ beliefs; a tendency to interpret “surprise” as 
referring to positive outcomes would instead predict that children should only provide desire-
based explanations (Wellman & Banerjee, 1991). Hence, children misunderstanding the meaning 
of “surprise” is unlikely to explain our findings. 
Although children are not limited to interpreting “surprise” as referring to positive 
events, they may nonetheless associate it with such events, and with situations that are likely to 
have positive results. Because of this, telling children about the desirability of the gumballs (i.e., 
red ones are yummy; black ones are yucky) may have negatively impacted their performance. It 
may have biased them to choose the character who had access to the machine with the larger 
proportion of “yummy” gumballs, as this character was more likely to have positive results (i.e., 
getting even more good gumballs). This could explain why 4-year-olds showed below chance 
performance. Thus, in the remaining experiments, the desirability information was removed. 
Experiment 2 
We examined whether making the gumball distributions more extreme would improve 
children’s surprise judgments. The experiment included two conditions: improbable and 
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impossible. The improbable condition used the same distribution of gumballs as Experiment 1, to 
see if the findings would replicate. In the impossible condition, one gumball machine contained 
only red gumballs and the other machine contained only black gumballs, and so it should have 
been impossible for one character to get a red gumball. We hoped this distribution would make 
the improbability of one character getting a red gumball more salient, and maximally surprising. 
Because 7-year-olds in the first experiment were able to correctly infer surprise using 
probabilistic distributions, only 4- to 6-year-olds were tested. 
Method 
 Participants. One hundred and twenty children participated: 40 4-year-olds (M age = 4;6 
years, range = 4;0 – 4;11; 18 girls), 40 5-year-olds (M = 5;5; range = 5;0 – 5;11; 22 girls), and 40 
6-year-olds (M = 6;3; range = 6;0 – 6;10; 17 girls). Children were recruited and tested at daycare 
centres and schools.  
 Materials and procedure. Children were told two stories (2 trials) about gumball 
machines and were randomly assigned to one of two conditions. In the improbable condition, one 
machine contained many red gumballs and just a few black ones (36 red, 4 black), and the other 
machine contained the reverse distribution (36 black, 4 red). In the impossible condition, one 
gumball machine contained all red gumballs and the other machine had all black gumballs. In 
both conditions, two identical-looking characters appeared, with each character at one machine. 
Children were told that both characters wanted a gumball. The characters pulled the handles of 
their machines, and each ended up getting a red gumball. Children were then asked which 




Here are two gumball machines. They have red gumballs and they have black gumballs. 
And look, here are two girls. They both want a gumball. To get a gumball, the girls pull 
down the handles, and the machines shake up all the gumballs. Look! They both got a red 
gumball. So now I have a question for you. Which girl is more surprised that she got a 
red gumball? 
Results and Discussion 
Of interest was whether children would be sensitive to the varying distribution of the 
gumball machines, and whether their surprise judgments would be more accurate for the 
impossible outcomes. Figure 3 shows children’s mean number of correct responses (i.e., 
choosing the character who was at the machine with fewer (or no) red gumballs). A GEE binary 
logistic regression with age (4, 5, 6) and condition (impossible, improbable) as between-subject 
factors revealed a significant main effect of age, Wald X2(df = 2, N = 120) = 7.26, p = .027. 
There was no effect of condition, Wald X2(df = 1, N = 120) = 2.24, p = .134, and no condition by 
age interaction, Wald X2(df = 2, N = 120) = 1.69, p = .431, though it is possible that a significant 
interaction would be revealed if we tested a larger sample of children. Pairwise comparisons 
revealed that 6-year-olds performed significantly better than 4-year-olds, p =.006, and 5-year-
olds, p =.038, but 4-year-olds and 5-year-olds did not differ in their performance, p = .635.  
We then summed children’s correct responses across both trials for a maximum score of 
two. Wilcoxon sign tests collapsed across conditions revealed that 6-year-olds (M = 1.33, SD = 
.764) predominantly chose the correct character, z = -2.50, p =.012, whereas, 4-year-olds (M = 
0.90, SD = .632), z = -1.00, p =.317, and 5-year-olds (M = 0.98, SD = .768), performed at chance, 
z = -0.21, p = .835. 
23 
 
These results reveal age-related improvements in children’s ability to use probability to 
infer surprise. However, children’s judgments of surprise did not improve when the outcome was 
impossible. Additionally, removing the desirability of the red gumballs moved 4-year-olds’ 
responses closer to chance, suggesting that 4-year-olds’ tendency to choose the more probable 
distribution in Experiment 1 was due to their inability to inhibit the impulse to choose the 
machine with more “yummy” gumballs. We next examined whether other manipulations might 
further improve children’s ability to infer surprise.  
 
Figure 3. Mean scores for children’s surprise judgments in Experiment 2 for the impossible and 
improbable conditions. Error bars show ± 1 standard error of the mean. Dotted line at a score of 
1 represents chance performance. 
Experiment 3 
 Thus far, it appears that young children have difficulty using probability to judge 
surprise. One explanation for this is that younger children do not see a connection between 
probability and surprise. Alternatively, they might understand that a connection exists, but might 
not spontaneously consider probability when inferring surprise – they might not spontaneously 
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consider that one girl had a better chance of getting a red gumball than the other. A related 
explanation for young children’s difficulty, though, is that they might not spontaneously consider 
the characters’ beliefs about getting a red gumball – they might not spontaneously consider that 
one girl believed she would get a red gumball and the other did not. On these views, children 
might perform better if they were explicitly prompted to consider the characters’ chances or 
beliefs before making a surprise inference. 
To examine these possibilities, children were asked a prompt question before seeing both 
characters receive a red gumball. In a belief condition, they were asked which character thinks 
they are going to get a red gumball; in a probability condition, they were asked which character 
has a better chance of getting a red gumball; finally, in a control condition, they were asked 
which character was at a machine with a particular coloured handle (always corresponding to the 
mostly red machine, as in the belief and probability conditions).  
Method 
 Participants. One hundred and twenty children participated: 60 5-year-olds (M = 5;6; 
range = 5;0 – 5;11; 27 girls), and 60 6-year-olds (M = 6;4; range = 6;0 – 6;11; 31 girls). Children 
were either tested at schools or in a quiet lab setting.  
 Materials and procedure. Children were again told two stories (2 trials) about two 
gumball machines. One machine contained many red gumballs and just a few purple ones (36 
red, 4 purple), and the other machine contained the reverse distribution (36 purple, 4 red). Two 
identical-looking characters then appeared, with each character at one machine. Children were 
told that both characters wanted a gumball. Children were randomly assigned to one of three 
prompt conditions. We describe these questions by referring to the scripts with the two girls. The 
belief prompt asked, “Which girl thinks she’s going to get a red gumball?”, the probability 
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prompt asked, “Which girl has a better chance of getting a red gumball?”, and the control prompt 
asked, “Which girl is standing beside the machine with a green handle?” After the prompt 
question, the characters pulled the handles of their machine, and both characters received a red 
gumball. Children were asked which character was more surprised. See Figure 4 for a sample of 
the story and script for the probability prompt. 
A few children initially failed the prompt question (see Results). When this happened, the 
experimenter said, “Let’s hear the story again”, repeated the story from the beginning, and re-
asked the prompt question. The experimenter repeated the prompt a maximum of two times (only 
four children needed to have the story repeated twice). All children answered the prompt 
question correctly after the repetitions. 
 
Figure 4. Sample slides and script of the probability prompt from Experiment 3 (Trial 1). 
Results and Discussion 
We first examined children’s initial responses to the prompt questions. Wilcoxon sign 
tests revealed that children chose the correct character more than would be expected by chance in 
the belief condition (86% correct), z = -5.21, p < .001, and in the probability condition (85% 
correct), z = -5.11, p < .001. In the belief condition, seven 5-year-olds and three 6-year-olds 
initially failed the prompt question. In the probability condition, seven 5-year-olds and four 6-
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year-olds initially failed the prompt question. Only one 5-year-old in each condition initially 
failed the prompt question on both trials. All children answered the control prompt question 
correctly. These findings demonstrate that children’s difficulty when inferring surprise is not a 
result of an inability to reason about beliefs or probability. 
Of primary interest was whether children who were asked the belief and probability 
prompt questions would perform better than children who were asked the control prompt 
question. Figure 5 shows children’s mean number of correct responses. A GEE binary logistic 
regression with age (5, 6) and condition (belief, probability, control) as between-subject factors 
revealed a marginally significant effect of condition, Wald X2(df = 2, N = 120) = 5.78, p = .056, a 
marginally significant effect of age, Wald X2(df = 1, N = 120) = 3.01, p = .083 (6-year-olds chose 
the correct character more often than 5-year-olds), and a marginally significant condition by age 
interaction, Wald X2(df = 2, N = 120) = 5.78, p = .056. Pairwise comparisons revealed that 
children in the probability prompt condition performed significantly better than children in the 
control prompt condition, p = .012, but no differences were found between children’s 
performance in the belief and control prompt conditions, p = .796. Children’s performance in the 
probability prompt condition was also significantly better than their performance in the belief 
prompt condition, p = .040. Next, we explored the marginally significant condition by age 
interaction.  
We explored each age group separately and found that 6-year-olds’ performance differed 
significantly by condition, Wald X2(df = 2, N = 120) = 7.98, p = .019, but 5-year-olds’ 
performance did not, Wald X2(df = 2, N = 120) = 0.84, p = .656. Pairwise comparisons revealed 
that 6-year-olds performed significantly better when asked the probability prompt (M = 1.80, SD 
= .523; these means reflect scores summed across the two trials) than when asked the belief 
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prompt (M = 1.05, SD = 1.00), p =.002, or the control prompt (M = 1.20, SD = .768), p =.003, 
but no differences were found between the belief prompt and the control prompt, p = .585. 
Further pairwise comparisons revealed that 6-year-olds performed significantly better than 5-
year-olds when prompted about probability, p =.003, but performed similarly to 5-year-olds 
when prompted about belief, p = .497, or the control prompt, p =.426. We then summed 
children’s correct responses across both trials for a maximum score of two. Wilcoxon sign tests 
revealed that only 6-year-olds in the probability prompt condition performed above chance 
levels, z = -3.77, p < .001. 
These results reveal that prompting 6-year-olds (but not 5-year-olds) to consider 
probability when inferring surprise improved their judgments, but prompting children of both 
ages about beliefs did not. Therefore, Experiment 3 provides two novel insights into children’s 
reasoning about surprise: First, asking children to consider probability appears to be more 
powerful than asking them to consider beliefs when inferring surprise (at least in this task). 
Second, children may not spontaneously relate probabilities to surprise when they first appreciate 
its relevance (around age 6), but they do see the importance of probability when prompted to 
consider it. 
Experiments 1 to 3 used a forced-choice paradigm in which children had to determine 
which of two characters is more surprised. A concern with this methodology is that children may 
not have thought that either character was surprised, and only chose a character because they 
were required to do so. Another concern with Experiment 3, is that the control condition might 
have hindered children’s performance because the prompt question was irrelevant to the task. We 
conducted a final study to address these concerns, while also attempting to replicate the findings 




Figure 5. Mean scores for children’s surprise judgments in Experiment 3 when asked the belief, 
probability, and control prompt questions. Error bars show ± 1 standard error of the mean. 
Dotted line at a score of 1 represents chance performance. 
Experiment 4 
 Experiment 4 further examines the effects of prompting children to consider a character’s 
chances and beliefs of receiving a gumball using a more conservative design. In this experiment, 
children were shown a single character in front of a gumball machine, and were asked either a 
belief, probability, or control prompt question. The character then received a minority coloured 
gumball, and children were asked two questions. The first asked how the character felt about 
receiving a gumball. We asked this question to allow children to express that the character was 
happy – in piloting, we found that children were strongly inclined to say this, regardless of what 
question about emotions was asked. This is unsurprising given that the character received a nice 
treat. The second question then asked how the character felt after seeing that the gumball was of 
the minority colour. Of key interest here was whether attributions of surprise would differ 
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depending on the prompt question children were asked. Only 6-year-olds were tested as they 
were the only age group that showed differences between the prompt conditions in Experiment 3. 
Method 
 Participants. Sixty 6-year-old children participated (M = 6;6; range = 6;0 – 6;11; 29 
girls). Children were recruited and tested at schools or in a museum.  
 Materials and procedure. Children were first familiarized to four faces – a neutral face, 
a happy face, a sad face, and a surprised face. Children were asked to identify each of the faces 
in a forced-choice pointing task (e.g., “Which face shows feeling happy?”); two different orders 
were randomly generated and used when asking children to identify the faces and children were 
randomly assigned to an order. After children identified each face, the experimenter repeated 
which emotion each face depicted, in the order that the faces were asked about. See Figure 6 for 
an example of the faces and questions asked.  
 
Figure 6. Example script and faces used to familiarize children to the four emotions in 
Experiment 4. 
Next, children were told two stories (2 trials, order counterbalanced across participants). 
In one story, a girl was at a gumball machine with many green gumballs and only a few orange 
ones; in the other story, a boy was at a gumball machine with many purple gumballs and only a 
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few red ones. For ease of exposition, we describe the procedure from the story with the girl.  
Children saw a girl appear at a gumball machine, and were told that she wanted a gumball. 
Children were randomly assigned to one of three prompt conditions. The belief prompt asked, 
“Which colour gumball does the girl think she’s going to get?”, the probability prompt asked, 
“Which colour gumball does the girl have a better chance of getting?”, and the control prompt 
asked, “Which colour gumball does the girl see more of?” After the prompt question, the girl 
pulled the handle of the machine, and received an orange gumball. The faces showing four 
emotions then appeared, and children were asked, “How does the girl feel about getting a 
gumball?”, and “How does the girl feel when she sees that the gumball is orange?”, respectively. 
Children responded by pointing to one of the faces. See Figure 7 for a sample of the story and 
script for the probability prompt. 
A few children initially failed the prompt question (see Results). When this happened, the 
experimenter said, “Let’s hear the story again”, repeated the story from the beginning, and re-
asked the prompt question. All children answered the prompt question correctly after the 
repetition.
 




Results and Discussion 
We first examined children’s initial responses to the prompt questions. Wilcoxon sign 
tests revealed that children chose the correct coloured gumballs more than would be expected by 
chance in the belief condition (70% correct), z = -2.53, p = .011, and in the probability condition 
(85% correct), z = -3.50, p < .001. In the belief condition, eleven 6-year-olds initially failed the 
prompt question. In the probability condition, five 6-year-olds initially failed the prompt 
question. Only one 6-year-old in each condition initially failed the prompt question on both 
trials. All children answered the control prompt question correctly.  
As predicted, when asked how the character felt about receiving a gumball, the majority 
of children (75%) answered “happy”. Of primary interest was whether children who were asked 
the belief and probability prompt questions would attribute surprise to the character more than 
children who were asked the control prompt question when asked how the character felt about 
receiving a minority coloured gumball. Figure 8 shows the mean number of times children 
indicated that the character would be surprised. A GEE binary logistic regression with condition 
(belief, probability, control) as a between-subject factor revealed a significant effect of condition, 
Wald X2(df = 2, N = 60) = 8.97, p = .011. Pairwise comparisons revealed that children in the 
probability prompt condition (M = 1.20, SD = .951), attributed surprise to the character 
significantly more than children in the control prompt condition (M = 0.35, SD = .671), p = .001, 
but no differences were found between children’s performance in the belief (M = 0.65, SD = 
.875) and control prompt conditions, p = .212. Children in the probability prompt condition also 
attributed surprise to the character marginally more than children in the belief prompt condition, 
p = .051.We then summed children’s attributions of surprise across both trials. Wilcoxon sign 
tests revealed that only children in the probability prompt condition chose surprise at above 
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chance levels, with chance being 0.50 out of 2, as there were four possible emotions to choose 
from and two trials, z = -2.69, p = .007. 
 
Figure 8. Mean number of times children attributed surprise in Experiment 4 when asked the 
belief, probability, and control prompt questions. Error bars show ± 1 standard error of the mean. 
Dotted line at a score of 0.5 represents chance performance. 
These results replicate Experiment 3 using a different methodology. We found that 
prompting 6-year-olds to consider probability led to an increase in their surprise attributions, but 
prompting them to consider belief did not have this effect. By allowing children to choose 
between four different emotions, we were able to see the cases in which children would choose 
surprise over other emotions. We also ruled out the concern that the control prompt in 
Experiment 3 might have confused children, as they continued to perform poorly in the control 
prompt condition in this experiment. Together, Experiments 3 and 4 show that for 6-year-olds, 
the link between probability and surprise is stronger than the link between belief and surprise. 
Although all of our Results sections included analyses from both trials, we also ran 
analyses that only included data from the first trial. The results of these analyses were 
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qualitatively similar with our main analyses, though some significant results became marginal 
due to the loss of statistical power. Because these analyses do not change the interpretation of 
our findings, we did not include them. 
General Discussion 
 In four experiments, we examined children’s ability to use probability when explicitly 
inferring other people’s surprise. Children’s performance improved with age. Whereas 4- and 5-
year-olds did not use probability to infer surprise, 6-year-olds did so inconsistently, and only 7-
year-olds did so reliably (Experiment 1). When getting a red gumball was impossible, and 
maximally surprising, children’s performance did not improve (Experiment 2). When children 
were prompted to consider either the characters’ chances or beliefs of getting a red gumball, only 
the prompt about probability improved 6-year-olds’ performance (Experiments 3 and 4). 
Together these findings suggest that children aged 5 and under fail to use probability to infer 
surprise, and that children aged 6 only have a limited ability to make these inferences (i.e., they 
require prompting to consistently infer surprise from probability). It is only by age 7 that children 
have a robust ability to infer surprise from probability.  
 The present experiments provide the first evidence that children use probability to infer 
others’ emotions. Theories of children’s emotional understanding posit two ways in which 
children understand the causes of emotions – relying on memorized scripts (e.g., Harris et al., 
1987; Widen & Russell, 2010, 2011), and considering mental states (e.g., Skerry & Spelke, 
2014; Wellman & Woolley, 1990). Neither theory refers to probability or related concepts. Our 
experiments suggest that these theories are insufficient for characterizing the factors that 
influence children’s emotion attributions, at least in the case of reasoning about surprise. Future 
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work is required to determine whether probabilistic inference influences children’s other emotion 
attributions. 
Furthermore, our findings advance knowledge of children’s understanding of surprise. 
They call into question the notion that children mainly conceptualize surprise in terms of beliefs, 
which is prevalent in the developmental literature, given that most research on surprise in 
childhood focuses on beliefs (e.g., Hadwin & Perner, 1991; MacLaren & Olson, 1993; Ruffman 
& Keenan, 1996; Wellman & Banerjee, 1991). We found that 6-year-olds’ performance 
improved when they were prompted to consider probability, but not when they were prompted to 
consider the character’s belief. If surprise were purely belief-based in childhood, then prompting 
children to consider beliefs should have improved their performance. At a minimum, these 
findings suggest that children’s understanding of surprise is not just belief-based, but also 
probability-based. 
Development and a Conceptual Shift 
The development of children’s ability to use probability to explicitly infer surprise is 
strikingly slow given that probability influences children’s expectations early in development. 
Very young children correctly reason about probability (e.g., Denison et al., 2006, 2013; Girotto 
et al., 2016) and use it to make sophisticated social inferences (Kushnir et al., 2010; Ma & Xu, 
2011). In our studies, we also found that children correctly responded to the prompt question 
about probability (Experiments 3 and 4), demonstrating that they are capable of probabilistic 
reasoning. Yet our findings suggest that children cannot use their understanding of probability to 
infer surprise until at least 6 years of age.  
If even infants and preschoolers use probability in social inferences, why do young 
children struggle to use probability when inferring surprise? One possibility is that their 
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difficulty stems from immature inhibitory control. Inhibitory control, the ability to suppress 
impulsive responses to stimuli, develops over children’s preschool years, improving immensely 
between the ages of 3 and 6 (e.g., Carlson & Moses, 2001; Carlson & Wang, 2007). In our 
experiments, both machines produce a red gumball; however, one machine always has more red 
gumballs than the other. Young children may have difficulty inhibiting the impulse to match the 
outcome (red gumball) to the mostly red gumball machine. However, this account is unlikely to 
explain all of the difficulties observed by children in our experiments. Older 4-year-olds are 
proficient at conflict inhibition tasks, which require them to provide a response that is 
incompatible with their impulsive response (Carlson, 2005; Carlson & Moses, 2001). Thus, 5-
year-olds should have easily overcome the inhibitory demands of our task. 
It is more plausible that children’s difficulty stems from a conceptual deficit. On this 
view, children aged 5 and under have independent understandings of probability and surprise, 
but do not see how they relate. By age 6, a conceptual change occurs, in which children come to 
integrate and relate their understandings of probability and surprise, although it is not until age 7 
that they spontaneously link the two concepts. Consistent with this account, previous studies 
show that children correctly reason about probability in explicit tasks by age 4 (e.g., Denison et 
al., 2006, 2013; Girotto et al., 2016), and they successfully infer surprise at ages 4 – 5 (e.g., 
Hadwin & Perner, 1991; MacLaren & Olson, 1993; Wellman & Banerjee, 1991; Wellman & 
Bartsch, 1988). Also, in our third experiment, when 5-year-olds were explicitly prompted to 
consider probability, they were still unable to use this information to infer surprise, suggesting 
that they had difficulty integrating probability with surprise. Future research can explore why the 
connection between probability and surprise arises relatively late in development, and what 
experiences are needed for this conceptual shift to occur. 
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Open Questions and Future Directions 
  Previous studies suggest that children’s understanding of surprise is belief-based (e.g., 
Hadwin & Perner, 1991; MacLaren & Olson, 1993; Wellman & Banerjee, 1991; Wellman & 
Bartsch, 1988). Further, participants in our experiments correctly anticipated what the characters 
believed they would get. Therefore, it is perhaps puzzling that our belief prompts did not 
improve children’s surprise judgments. Why was this prompt ineffectual? One possibility is that 
although children as young as age 4 use beliefs to explain surprise (e.g., Wellman & Banerjee, 
1991), they might not use beliefs to infer surprise until later. The most careful study of children 
using belief to infer surprise found that they only started making these inferences at age 7, and 
that younger children instead used ignorance to infer surprise (Ruffman & Keenan, 1996). This 
could explain why our belief prompts were ineffectual.   
 Although I only investigated children’s ability to use probability to infer surprise, they 
might also use probability to infer other emotions. For example, anyone would be happy about 
winning a contest; however, someone who wins a contest that 500 other people entered might be 
happier and more excited than someone who wins a contest that one other person entered. 
Similarly, losing a contest that one other person entered would be more disappointing than losing 
a contest that 500 other people entered – the outcome is the same, but the probability of the 
outcome occurring changes the degree of emotion experienced. If children do use probability to 
infer other emotions, this would further suggest that theories of emotion attribution should be 
expanded to acknowledge the role of probability. Thus, in the next chapter, I investigate whether 





Chapter Three: Children use probability to infer other people’s happiness (Paper Two) 
A version of this paper is published: 
Doan, T., Friedman, O., & Denison, S. (2020). Young children use probability to infer happiness 
and the quality of outcomes. Psychological Science, 31(2), 149-159. doi: 
10.1177/0956797619895282 
Our happiness with an outcome depends on the likelihood of better or worse alternatives. 
For example, in gambling simulations, adults feel worse about not winning any money if their 
chances of winning were high, rather than low (Mellers et al., 1997). Such emotional reactions 
are widely believed to depend on counterfactual comparisons in which people’s emotions are 
intensified when they know they could have had a better or worse outcome (e.g., Bell, 1985; 
Loomes & Sugden, 1986; Shepperd & McNulty, 2002; van Dijk & van der Pligt, 1997). 
People may also consider the probability of better or worse outcomes when inferring 
others’ happiness. If so, this would suggest that people’s intuitive theory of happiness is linked 
with their understanding of probability. Here we explore this proposal from a developmental 
perspective.  
Much previous work suggests that young children have difficulty seeing the link between 
alternative outcomes and emotions. Children do not experience counterfactual emotions 
themselves until they are 5-7 (O’Connor et al., 2012; Weisberg & Beck, 2010). Further, they 
have difficulty using counterfactual comparisons to anticipate others’ emotions (e.g., Guttentag 
& Ferrell, 2004; see Beck & Riggs, 2014 for a review). In one study, 5-7-year-olds considered an 
agent who could choose one of two sealed boxes and keep its contents (Weisberg & Beck, 2010). 
The chosen box was revealed to contain just a few stickers, whereas the unchosen box held many 
more. Children did not indicate that the agent would feel badly about having chosen the box with 
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fewer stickers, even though children did feel badly when they were the ones to make this worse 
choice for themselves. Similarly, young children often fail to infer that expectations (which 
provide counterfactual alternatives) can influence happiness (Lara et al., 2019; but see Asaba et 
al., 2019 for evidence of this ability in children aged 5). Importantly, though, none of these 
studies specifically manipulated the odds of better or worse outcomes. 
Providing young children with information about the probability of better or worse 
outcomes might allow them to infer happiness. This information may matter because the odds of 
an alternative outcome affects its impact. For example, children might use probabilistic 
reasoning to first assess the quality of an outcome (i.e., how good or bad it is), and then use this 
assessment to infer happiness. When someone with a high probability of winning money does 
not actually win any, children could first assess that this outcome is bad or unlucky, and then 
conclude that the person is unhappy. It is plausible that children might make probability-based 
inferences of happiness because infants and preschoolers make simple probabilistic inferences 
(e.g., Denison et al., 2006; Denison & Xu, 2010; Téglás et al., 2007), and preschoolers also use 
probability in social judgments (e.g., inferring preferences; Kushnir et al., 2010; Ma & Xu, 
2011).  
 To investigate whether children infer other people’s happiness by considering the 
probability of better and worse outcomes, we focussed on children aged 4-6. Children in this age 
range infer happiness by relying on memorized scripts, such as people are happy when they 
receive presents (e.g., Widen & Russell, 2010, 2011; also see Fehr & Russell, 1984). They also 
make these inferences by considering people’s mental states (e.g., Harris et al., 1989; Wellman 
& Woolley, 1990). For example, 5-year-olds predict a boy will be happy if he believes a box 
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contains candy, even if its actual contents are undesirable (Hadwin & Perner, 1991). Perhaps 4-
6-year-olds also infer happiness by considering probability.  
 To investigate this possibility, 4-6-year-olds in Experiment 1 rated how happy a girl felt 
upon receiving equal numbers of yummy and yucky gumballs from a gumball machine. Across 
conditions, the girl either had a high chance of getting mostly yummy ones, or a high chance of 
getting mostly yucky ones. Experiment 2 added a condition where the girl was equally likely to 
get yummy or yucky gumballs. Experiments 3 and 4 investigated children’s judgments about 




Participants. We tested 180 children: 60 4-year-olds (M = 4;6 [years; months]; range = 
4;0 – 4;11; 29 girls), 60 5-year-olds (M = 5;5; range = 5;0 – 5;11; 26 girls), and 60 6-year-olds 
(M = 6;5; range = 6;0 – 6;11; 34 girls). Our sample size of 30 participants per cell means that we 
might have low power to detect small to medium effects, but we followed it based on our lab 
stopping rule when these data were collected. Our lab chose this stopping rule because we felt it 
sufficed to reveal effects in previous developmental experiments using similar designs. Children 
from all experiments were individually tested at schools and daycares in a mid-sized Canadian 
city in Southwestern Ontario. All data collection occurred between April, 2017 and April, 2019. 
Materials and procedure. All materials were shown on a laptop computer. Children 
were told a story about a gumball machine containing yummy red gumballs and yucky black 
ones. Children in each age range were randomly assigned to see this story in one of two between-
subjects conditions. In the Mostly Yummy condition, the gumball machine contained many red 
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gumballs and just a few black ones (46 red; 4 black). In the Mostly Yucky condition, the gumball 
machine contained the reverse distribution (46 black; 4 red). 
A girl appeared beside the gumball machine in both conditions. She wanted red gumballs 
and children were asked a comprehension question to confirm that they understood. The girl 
pulled the handle of the machine and received two red and two black gumballs. Children were 
asked to rate how she felt using a 7-point happy face scale, ranging from extremely sad to 
extremely happy. See Figure 9 for a sample of the story and script. 
In both conditions, the girl had an extremely high chance of mostly or exclusively 
receiving the more common type of gumball. For example, in the Mostly Yucky condition, she 
had a 97% chance of getting at least 3 black gumballs. Hence, getting 2 red and 2 black gumballs 
is a relatively good outcome in the Mostly Yucky condition, and a relatively bad outcome in the 
Mostly Yummy condition. Thus, if children infer happiness by considering the probability of 
better or worse outcomes, they should rate the girl as happier in the Mostly Yucky condition than 
in the Mostly Yummy condition. 
 
Figure 9. Sample slides and script for the Mostly Yucky condition. The Mostly Yummy 




Results and Discussion 
 Figure 10 shows children’s mean happiness ratings; also see Table 1 for means and 
standard deviations for all experiments. Data for all experiments are available at 
https://osf.io/e3a2k/?view_only=505fab0517914db1b065b2285748d565. A 2 (condition: Mostly 
Yummy, Mostly Yucky) x 3 (age: 4, 5, 6) ANOVA revealed a significant age by condition 
interaction, F(2,174) = 4.39, p = .014, ηp
2 = .048. There were no main effects of condition, 
F(1,174) = 3.40, p = .067, ηp
2 = .019, or of age, F(2,174) = 2.09, p = .127, ηp
2 = .023.  We 
explored each age group separately and found that both 5- and 6-year-olds rated the girl as 
significantly happier in the Mostly Yucky condition than in the Mostly Yummy condition, t(58) 
= -2.07, p = .043, d = 0.53, and t(58) = -3.07, p = .003, d = 0.79, respectively. However, 4-year-
olds did not show differences between the two conditions, t(58) = 1.18, p = .243, d = 0.31.  
 These findings suggest that 5- and 6-year-olds can use probability to infer happiness 
However, it is unclear whether this effect was mostly driven by one condition (e.g., children 
inferring disappointment in the Mostly Yummy condition, without inferring relief in the Mostly 
Yucky condition). 
We examine this in Experiment 2 by seeking to replicate Experiment 1 with 5-6-year-








Means and standard deviations for ratings in Experiments 1 – 5 
Experiment  Judgment-
type 
 Age  Condition 





1  Happiness  4  1.07 (2.32)  0.33 (2.50)  -- 
    5  0.47 (2.45)  1.63 (1.88)  -- 
    6  0.83 (1.86)  2.13 (1.38)  -- 
           
2  Happiness  5  1.00 (2.20)  1.67 (1.83)  1.30 (2.25) 
    6  0.17 (1.74)  1.60 (1.22)  1.33 (1.79) 
           
3  Quality  4  0.40 (2.69)  1.87 (1.74)  -- 
    5  0.40 (2.33)  1.23 (1.79)  -- 
    6  0.10 (1.49)  1.60 (1.69)  -- 
           
4  Happiness  4  1.05 (2.42)  0.80 (2.42)  -- 
           
  Quality  4  0.85 (1.85)  1.95 (1.58)  -- 
           
5  Happiness  Adults  -0.14 (1.63)  0.36 (1.64)  -- 
           





Figure 10. Children’s mean happiness ratings, ranging from -3 (extremely sad) to 3 (extremely 
happy). Error bars show ± 1 standard error of the mean. 
Experiment 2 
Methods 
 Preregistration. This study was conducted after Experiments 1 and 3, and was 
preregistered at http://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=3ae2dy. The preregistration covered the 
number of participants, design, and analysis plan.   
Participants. We tested 180 children: 90 5-year-olds (M = 5;6; range = 5;0 – 5;11; 47 
girls), and 90 6-year-olds (M = 6;6; range = 6;0 – 6;11; 41 girls). One additional child was tested 
and excluded because they did not provide a rating. 
Materials and procedure. We repeated the procedure from Experiment 1, but added a 
third 50/50 baseline condition in which the gumball machine contained half yummy and half 
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yucky gumballs (25 red, 25 black). Children in each age range were randomly assigned to one of 
the three conditions. 
Results and Discussion 
Figure 11 shows children’s mean happiness ratings. A 3 (condition: Mostly Yummy, 
Mostly Yucky, 50/50) x 2 (age: 5, 6) ANOVA revealed a main effect of condition, F(2,174) = 
4.99, p = .008, ηp
2 = .054. There was no effect of age, F(1,174) = 1.08, p = .301, ηp
2 = .006, and 
no age by condition interaction, F(2,174) = 0.97, p = .382, ηp
2 = .011. Follow-up t-tests revealed 
that children rated the girl as significantly happier in the Mostly Yucky condition than in the 
Mostly Yummy condition, t(118) = -3.21, p = .002, d = 0.59, and happier in the 50/50 condition 
than in the Mostly Yummy condition, t(118) = -2.00, p = .048, d = 0.37. Happiness ratings did 
not significantly differ between the Mostly Yucky and 50/50 conditions, t(118) = 0.97, p = .335, 
d = 0.17. 
We replicated the findings that 5-6-year-olds use probability to infer happiness. Further, 
we found this was driven by the understanding that the girl would be relatively upset when she 
was initially more likely to get a better outcome.  
In the remaining experiments, we turn to the finding (from the first experiment) that 4-
year-olds did not use probability to infer happiness. Four-year-olds’ failure is unlikely to stem 
from an inability to consider basic probability, as children this age expect a majority item in a 
distribution to be sampled most often (e.g., Denison et al., 2006; Girotto et al., 2016). One 
explanation for their failure is that 4-year-olds struggled to give lower happiness ratings for the 
“good” machine and higher happiness ratings for the “bad” machine. Four-year-olds might find 
this difficult because it requires inhibiting the impulse to match visually “good” scenes with 
positive emotions (e.g., Doan et al., 2018).  
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To examine this possibility, we next investigated whether 4-6-year-olds can use 
probability to assess the quality of an outcome. As noted above, this could be a necessary step in 
probability-based inferences of happiness. If the 4-year-olds do use probability to assess quality, 
this would show that their failure does not stem from inhibitory demands, but may instead reflect 
a deeper breakdown in the inferences linking probability and happiness. 
 
Figure 11. Children’s mean happiness ratings, ranging from -3 (extremely sad) to 3 (extremely 
happy). Error bars show ± 1 standard error of the mean. 
Experiment 3 
Methods 
Participants. We tested 180 children: 60 4-year-olds (M = 4;7; range = 4;0 – 4;11; 27 
girls), 60 5-year-olds (M = 5;5; range = 5;0 – 5;11; 28 girls), and 60 6-year-olds (M = 6;5; range 
= 6;0 – 6;11; 33 girls). Two additional children were tested and excluded because they did not 
provide a rating. 
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Materials and procedure. The materials, procedure, and design were identical to 
Experiment 1, except that the girl was removed from the stories. We used the same rating scale 
as in the previous experiments, but children were asked to rate how good the outcome was, and 
not about happiness. Children were randomly assigned to either the Mostly Yummy condition or 
the Mostly Yucky condition. See Figure 12 for a sample of the story and script for the Mostly 
Yucky condition. 
 
Figure 12. Sample slides and script for the Mostly Yucky condition. The Mostly Yummy 
condition was identical, but the distribution of yummy and yucky gumballs was reversed. 
Results and Discussion 
Figure 13 shows children’s mean quality judgments. A 2 (condition: Mostly Yummy, 
Mostly Yucky) x 3 (age: 4, 5, 6) ANOVA revealed a main effect of condition, F(1,174) = 18.07, 
p < .001, ηp
2 = .094, where children rated the outcome as better in the Mostly Yucky condition 
than in the Mostly Yummy condition. There was no effect of age, F(2,174) = 0.46, p = .635, ηp
2 
= .005, and no age by condition interaction, F(2,174) = 0.53, p = .590, ηp
2 = .006.  
These findings demonstrate that by age 4, children can determine the relative quality of 
an outcome, and can inhibit the impulse to match overwhelmingly “good” visual scenes with 
good ratings. Together, the experiments so far suggest that 4-year-olds can use probability to 
assess the relative quality of an outcome, but not to infer happiness. However, we must be 
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cautious about this conclusion because it rests on the results of separate experiments. To provide 
more certainty, we investigated the potential developmental gap between 4-year-olds’ 
assessments of quality and inferences of happiness within a single experiment.  
 
Figure 13. Children’s mean outcome quality judgments, ranging from -3 (extremely bad) to 3 
(extremely good). Error bars show ± 1 standard error of the mean. 
Experiment 4 
Methods 
 Preregistration. This study was preregistered at 
http://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=e43tu8. The preregistration covered the number of 
participants, design, and analysis plan. 
Participants. We tested 80 4-year-olds (M = 4;6; range = 4;0 – 4;11; 36 girls). Two 
additional children were tested and excluded because they did not provide a rating. Our 
preregistered sample size of 40 participants per cell is larger than the stopping rule in the 
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previous experiments because this experiment focussed on just one age group (i.e., meaning that 
the overall sample of participants was smaller than in the previous experiments). 
Materials and procedure. We used a 2X2 design in which condition (Mostly Yummy, 
Mostly Yucky) was manipulated within-subjects (order counterbalanced across children), and 
judgment-type (Happiness, Quality) was manipulated between-subjects. In the stories, a girl 
approached a gumball machine and received 2 yummy gumballs and 2 yucky ones. A happy face 
scale then appeared, and children were either asked about the girl’s happiness (“How does the 
girl feel about the gumballs that she got?”) or about the quality of the outcome (“How good was 
that?”). See Figure 14 for a sample of the story and script for the Mostly Yucky condition. 
 
Figure 14. Sample slides and script for the Mostly Yucky condition. The Mostly Yummy 
condition was identical, but the distribution of yummy and yucky gumballs was reversed. 
Results and Discussion 
Figure 15 shows children’s mean happiness and quality ratings. A 2 (condition: Mostly 
Yummy, Mostly Yucky) x 2 (judgment-type: Happiness, Quality) mixed ANOVA revealed a 
condition by judgment-type interaction, F(1,78) = 5.33, p = .024, ηp
2 = .064. There were no main 
effects of condition, F(1,78) = 2.11, p = .150, ηp
2 = .026, or judgment-type, F(1,78) = 1.67, p = 
.200, ηp
2 = .021. 
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We conducted follow-up t-tests to better understand the interaction. When rating quality, 
children gave higher ratings in the Mostly Yucky condition than in the Mostly Yummy 
condition, t(39) = -2.83, p = .007, d = 0.46. However, when judging happiness, there was no 
significant difference between the Mostly Yummy and Mostly Yucky conditions, t(39) = 0.57, p 
= .570, d = 0.09, replicating our previous findings. 
 The findings replicated the developmental gap in which 4-year-olds succeed in using 
probability to assess quality, but not to infer happiness. We wondered whether this gap between 
quality and happiness continues later in the lifespan. If so, this might suggest that probability is 
linked more closely with quality than with happiness. Our earlier experiments provided some 
evidence against this possibility. Specifically, they showed that older children use probability to 
infer both happiness (Experiments 1 and 2) and quality (Experiment 3). But because these were 
assessed in different studies (which also used slightly different methods), those experiments only 
provide a weak basis for comparing these judgments. To better examine this possibility, we 




Figure 15. Children’s mean happiness and outcome quality ratings, ranging from -3 (extremely 
sad/bad) to 3 (extremely happy/good). Error bars show ± 1 standard error of the mean. 
Experiment 5 
Methods 
 Preregistration. This study was preregistered at 
http://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=mt7mz9. The preregistration covered the number of 
participants, design, and analysis plan. 
Participants. The experiment was successfully completed by 254 adults (M = 35; 111 
females) recruited using Amazon Mechanical Turk. Based on our preregistration, we originally 
recruited 300 participants, but excluded participants who failed at least one of our two 
comprehension check questions (N = 45). One additional participant was excluded because they 
did not provide a rating on one trial, and so their data could not be analyzed. Our decision to 
recruit 300 participants was based on the assumption that would leave us with at least 100 
participants per between-subject condition (i.e., after exclusions for failures of comprehension 
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checks). We felt that 100 participants per condition would suffice to reveal effects given findings 
from previous online studies of adults that used similar designs. 
Materials and procedure. The experiment used the same 2X2 design as Experiment 4: 
condition (Mostly Yummy, Mostly Yucky) was manipulated within-subjects, and judgment-type 
(Happiness, Quality) was manipulated between-subjects. The stories were similar to those in 
Experiment 4, except each was conveyed using two images, each shown on a separate page. The 
first page showed a girl at a gumball machine, with the script, “Here’s a girl at a gumball 
machine. There are red gumballs and black gumballs. The red gumballs are very very yummy 
and the black gumballs are very very yucky”. The second page showed the girl had received two 
yummy and two yucky gumballs, with the script, “The girl pulled the handle and got some 
gumballs”. The test question (“How does the girl feel about the gumballs that she got?” or “How 
good was that?”) appeared lower down on the page, along with the same happy face scale used 
with children. Participants responded by clicking on one of the faces. 
Results and Discussion 
Figure 16 shows adults’ mean happiness and quality ratings. A 2 (condition: Mostly 
Yummy, Mostly Yucky) x 2 (judgment-type: Happiness, Quality) mixed ANOVA revealed a 
main effect of condition, F(1,252) = 11.95, p = .001, ηp
2 = .045, where adults had higher ratings 
in the Mostly Yucky condition than in the Mostly Yummy condition. There was no main effect 
of judgment-type, F(1,252) = 1.22, p = .270, ηp
2 = .005, and no condition by judgment-type 
interaction, F(1,252) = 0.001, p = .972, ηp
2 = .000. 
 These findings suggest that for the stories we showed children, adults use probability to a 
similar extent when inferring happiness and outcome quality. As such, the findings do not 




Figure 16. Adults’ mean happiness and outcome quality ratings, ranging from -3 (extremely 
sad/bad) to 3 (extremely happy/good). Error bars show ± 1 standard error of the mean. 
General Discussion 
 We examined whether children and adults use probability to infer people’s happiness and 
the quality of outcomes. For children aged 5 and 6 (and for adults), happiness and quality 
judgments both depended on whether a better outcome was initially more likely. At age 4, 
children did not use probability to infer the girl’s happiness, but did use it to infer the relative 
quality of the outcome. 
 We found that children use probability to infer negative emotions (e.g., disappointment), 
but not positive ones (e.g., relief, elation). In the second experiment, we found that relative to the 
baseline condition (equal odds of receiving yummy and yucky gumballs), children gave more 
negative emotional ratings when a better outcome was initially more likely. But they did not give 
significantly more positive ratings when a worse outcome was initially more likely. This 
asymmetry is broadly consistent with many previous findings, including those suggesting that: 
probability more strongly affects adults’ negative than positive emotions (e.g., van Dijk & van 
53 
 
der Pligt, 1997); children experience the negative emotion regret before they experience the 
positive emotion relief (Weisberg & Beck, 2010); and children and adults react more strongly to 
having less than others (disadvantageous inequality) than to having more (advantageous 
inequality; e.g., Blake & McAuliffe, 2011; Boyce et al., 2010; Lobue et al., 2011). 
 We also found that children use probability to assess quality before they can use it to 
infer happiness. This developmental gap is counterintuitive. If 4-year-olds use probability to 
assess quality, and likewise understand that negative events lead to unhappiness (e.g., Widen & 
Russell, 2011), why do they struggle to see how probability can affect emotions? One 
explanation is that 4-year-olds do not spontaneously draw both inferences in this chain (i.e., 
probability → quality, quality → happiness). When asked how the girl feels, 4-year-olds might 
not have realized that they should start by inferring the quality of the outcome. On this account, 
4-year-olds might do better if prompted to first assess quality. However, alternative explanations 
for the developmental gap between inferences of quality and happiness are possible. Perhaps 
older children use probability to infer happiness, without first assessing quality (e.g., by 
considering probability in relation to desires). On this account, 4-year-olds might fail because 
they have not connected the disparate conceptual domains of emotion and probability. 
 Regardless, these accounts leave open deeper questions about how children and adults 
use information about probability to infer happiness and assess quality. They could use this 
information to establish a “standard of comparison” against which actual outcomes are 
considered (e.g., Cadotte, Woodruff, & Jenkins, 1987). For instance, when a good outcome is 
highly probable, this establishes a high standard of comparison. Children (and adults) may then 
judge that a mediocre outcome is bad because it falls short of this standard (e.g., a gumball 
machine with 90% good gumballs sets this as the standard, and so the outcome of 50% good 
54 
 
gumballs is disappointing). This type of reasoning might be easier for younger children as the 
actual outcome can be compared to a standard without specifically considering that a better or 
worse outcome could have occurred.  
Alternatively, children’s and adults’ inferences could depend on counterfactual 
comparisons. For example, when the machine mostly contained yummy gumballs, participants 
may have judged the outcome was relatively bad because they recognized that a better outcome 
could easily have occurred. At first thought, reasoning in this way seems unlikely for children. 
Although young children can reason about counterfactuals (Nyhout & Ganea, 2019; also see 
German & Nichols, 2003; Harris et al., 1996), they may only come to use counterfactuals to infer 
others’ happiness at age 7 (e.g., Guttentag & Ferrell, 2004). However, there is reason to think 
that the manipulation of probability may have made using counterfactuals to infer emotions 
easier. When the prior probability of an alternative outcome occurring is high, it may feel closer 
to happening, thus possibly intensifying the emotion felt when it does not happen. If children 
considered the closeness of the counterfactual alternative outcomes, they may have used it to 
infer emotions. I look at this possibility more closely in the next chapter. 
We next consider two broader implications of the findings. First, our findings advance 
knowledge of the ways in which children attribute happiness. They show that children do not 
only infer happiness by relying on memorized scripts (e.g., Russell 1990; Widen & Russell, 
2010, 2011), or by considering others’ mental states (e.g., Hadwin & Perner, 1991; Wellman & 
Bartsch, 1988). In addition to these methods for inferring happiness, children also draw on their 
understanding of probability. Second, our findings advance knowledge of how children use 
probability information to make social inferences. Preschool-aged children use probability to 
infer preferences (Kushnir et al., 2010; Ma & Xu, 2011), and older children use it to infer others’ 
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surprise (Doan et al., 2018). We extend these findings by showing that 4- and 5-year-olds use 
probability to infer outcome quality and others’ happiness. We found evidence for a 
developmental lag between children’s probability-based inferences of outcome quality and 
happiness. With development, probabilistic understanding may be gradually integrated into 




Chapter Four: Children use probability and (maybe) close counterfactual reasoning to 
infer other people’s happiness (Paper Three) 
A version of this paper is under review: 
Doan, T., Friedman, O., & Denison, S. (under review). Oh…so close! Children’s close 
counterfactual reasoning and emotion inferences. Developmental Psychology. 
People’s emotional reactions depend not only on actual events, but also on close 
counterfactuals – events that did not happen but easily could have (Kahneman & Varey, 1990). 
Consider the classic scenario from Kahneman and Tversky (1982), in which Mr. Tees missed his 
flight by five minutes, while Mr. Crane missed his flight by 30 minutes. Who is more upset? 
Most people agree that Mr. Tees is more upset. This is presumably because he was closer to 
making his flight, making it much easier to imagine a world in which he did. Besides affecting 
judgments about others’ emotional reactions (e.g., Johnson, 1986; Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; 
Medvec & Savitsky, 1997), close counterfactuals also affect emotional reactions firsthand (e.g., 
Markman & Tetlock, 2000; McMullen & Markman, 2002; also see Medvec et al., 1995, for 
evidence of this in Olympic medalists’ emotions as rated by others). 
 Many factors can affect the perceived closeness of a counterfactual outcome. In the 
example of Mr. Tees and Mr. Crane, closeness depended on temporal proximity – it feels like 
Mr. Tees could have easily made his flight because he was barely late. Counterfactual closeness 
can also depend on spatial and numerical proximity (e.g., Ong et al., 2015; Teigen, 1996; 
Turnbull, 1981). In one study, adults were told about two characters who each spun wheels that 
were equally divided into alternating sectors of blue, red, and yellow. One wheel had three 
sectors, while the other had 18 sectors. Although both characters landed on the winning color 
(red), the character who spun the wheel with many sectors was viewed as luckier, presumably 
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because this character was spatially closer to not winning (i.e., with many sectors, losing colors 
were spatially proximate; Teigen, 1996).  
Counterfactual closeness also depends on probability (e.g., Kahneman & Varey, 1990; 
Roese & Olson, 2014). If the prior probability of an event is high, then even though it does not 
occur, people may judge that it nearly did. This in turn, can affect emotions (e.g., Bell, 1985). In 
a gambling task, people felt worse about winning nothing if their initial chances of winning 
money were high compared to low, presumably because they were closer to winning in the 
former case (Mellers et al., 1997; van Dijk & van der Pligt, 1997). 
 Here we explore children’s ability to consider close counterfactual alternatives when 
inferring other people’s emotions. Children can reason counterfactually by age 4 (e.g., Beck et 
al., 2006; German & Nichols, 2003; Harris et al., 1996; but also see Beck et al., 2010). For 
example, children learned that a box lights up if one block is placed on it, but not if a different 
block is used. When the box lit up after both blocks were put on it, 4- and 5-year-olds reasoned 
counterfactually about whether it would have lit up if each block had not been placed on it 
(Nyhout & Ganea, 2019). Children can also consider close counterfactuals when the actual 
outcome and the counterfactual alternative are spatially close. In one study, children watched as 
two toy horses galloped along a table; one horse fell and the other stopped just at the edge. 
Around age 5, children were able to say which of the two horses almost fell (Beck & Guthrie, 
2011). 
Children’s understanding of the emotional consequences of counterfactuals may develop 
somewhat later. Children do not experience counterfactual emotions until the ages of 5 to 7 (e.g., 
Guerini et al., in press; O’Connor et al., 2012; Weisberg & Beck, 2010; but see Weisberg & 
Beck, 2012, for evidence of slightly earlier development), and they do not use counterfactual 
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comparisons to infer other people’s emotions until at least age 7 (e.g., Amsel & Smalley, 2000; 
Beck & Crilly, 2009; Guttentag & Ferrell, 2004; see Beck & Riggs, 2014, for a review). For 
example, in Weisberg & Beck (2010), a character won a mundane prize when choosing between 
one of two opaque boxes. When it was revealed that the character could have won a better prize 
(a counterfactual possibility), even 7-year-olds did not predict that he would now be sad about 
the prize he got. This finding suggests that children do not consider counterfactual alternatives 
when inferring others’ emotions. 
However, no studies have examined whether children consider the closeness of 
counterfactual alternatives when inferring emotions. For example, in Weisberg and Beck (2010), 
the character was not closer to winning one prize over the other. Without comparison conditions 
that manipulate the closeness or the odds of the counterfactual alternative, we cannot know 
whether children’s emotion inferences depend on close counterfactuals. As we saw with Mr. 
Tees and Mr. Crane, the closeness of the counterfactual alternatives is critical: a disappointing 
outcome may be especially disappointing if a desirable outcome nearly happened. If children use 
close counterfactuals to infer emotions, this will provide further support that counterfactual 
reasoning is central to children’s thinking from early in development (Weisberg & Gopnik, 
2013). 
One recent finding suggests that young children might consider close counterfactuals 
when inferring emotions. Children saw two bowlers, one whose ball was on a trajectory to knock 
down many pins and another whose ball was on a trajectory to knock down none. In the end, 
both knocked down 3 of 6 pins. Children aged 5 expected the bowler who almost knocked-down 
all the pins to feel worse than the one who almost knocked-down none (Asaba et al., 2019). 
Children might have based this inference on close counterfactuals – they might have reasoned 
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that the first bowler was more upset because they nearly knocked down all the pins. But as Asaba 
et al. (2019) suggest, children might have based their inferences on the characters’ expectations. 
Further, children were not asked about their counterfactual thoughts, making it difficult to know 
whether they were using close counterfactuals to infer emotions. 
We conducted three experiments to examine whether children consider close 
counterfactuals when inferring others’ emotions. In our first experiment, we tested children aged 
4 to 6 as this is the age range in which they begin to reason counterfactually (e.g., Nyhout & 
Ganea, 2019). However, our later experiments were limited to children aged 5 to 6 as our 
youngest children showed difficulty in our tasks. In each experiment, children heard stories 
about a girl who won a mundane prize. Across conditions, we manipulated whether the girl later 
discovered that her odds of winning a more attractive prize had been high or low. When the odds 
were very high, the closest counterfactual alternative was winning the attractive prize. However, 
when the odds were low, the closest counterfactual alternative was winning a mundane prize. 
Thus, the closeness of the counterfactual alternative was manipulated by differences in 
probability across conditions. If children consider close counterfactuals, they should recognize 
that the girl would be happier when she had a low chance of winning an attractive prize than 
when she had a high chance. In later experiments, we added a second cue to counterfactual 
closeness – spatial proximity – the girl was in closer proximity to a more attractive prize in the 
condition in which it was more probable. Children were also asked a question assessing whether 
they recognized the closeness of the counterfactual alternative where the girl won a more 
attractive prize. 
In our final experiment, we tested adults. Some studies investigating the influence of 
close counterfactuals on emotions have confounded close counterfactuals with prior beliefs. For 
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example, in gambling tasks, the odds of winning money are known beforehand, so emotion 
ratings could have been based on participants’ prior beliefs about winning instead of whether 
they were close to winning (e.g., Mellers et al., 1997; van Dijk & van der Pligt, 1997; but for an 
exception see Ong et al., 2015). We tested adults to address this concern and to provide a 
reference point for comparison with children’s emotion and close counterfactual responses. 
Experiment 1 
 Children heard a story about a girl who chose one of ten closed boxes and won a regular 
balloon. She then either learned that most of the other boxes contained special balloons or that 
most contained regular balloons. Children were asked how the girl felt about getting the regular 
balloon and whether the girl could have easily gotten a special balloon. 
Methods 
 Participants. We tested 180 4-6-year-olds (M = 5;6 [years; months]; range = 4;0 – 6;11; 
86 girls). There were 60 4-year-olds (M = 4;5; range = 4;0 – 4;11; 29 girls), 60 5-year-olds (M = 
5;6; range = 5;0 – 5;11; 32 girls), and 60 6-year-olds (M = 6;6; range = 6;0 – 6;11; 25 girls), with 
equal numbers of children per age-in-years randomly assigned to each between-subjects 
condition. Sample sizes for all experiments were decided in advance based on a stopping rule. 
Our lab chose the stopping rule of 30 participants per cell because it sufficed to reveal effects in 
previous developmental experiments using similar designs (e.g., Asaba et al., 2019; Doan et al., 
2020; Shaw & Olson, 2015). In all experiments, children were individually tested at schools and 
daycares in a mid-sized Canadian city in Southwestern Ontario. Demographic information was 
not formally collected, but the region is predominantly middle-class, and approximately 79% of 
residents in this region are White, with Chinese and South Asians as the most visible minorities. 
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This research, submitted under the name, “Social Understanding in Children” (ORE#30395), 
received ethics clearance through the University of Waterloo’s Research Ethics Committee. 
 Materials and procedure. All materials were shown on a laptop computer. Children 
were told a story about a girl who could win either a regular or a special balloon. See Figure 17 
for the story and script. The girl stood before ten closed boxes that each contained a balloon (the 
balloons were not visible). The girl could choose one of the boxes and win the balloon in it. She 
chose a box and received a regular balloon. Next, she was shown the balloons in the remaining 
boxes. Children were asked how the girl felt about getting the regular balloon, and responded 
using a 7-point happy face scale, ranging from extremely happy to extremely sad.  
After children rated the girl’s happiness, they were asked whether she could have easily 
gotten a special balloon, with their responses recorded as either “yes” or “no”. We asked the 
close counterfactual question in this way as this phrasing has been used to assess counterfactual 
reasoning with adults in other studies (e.g., Teigen 1995, 1997). 
Children saw the story in one of two between-subjects conditions. In the Mostly Special 
condition, there were eight special balloons and two regular balloons (80% chance of getting a 
special balloon). In the Mostly Regular condition, there were eight regular balloons and two 





Figure 17. Slides and scripts for Experiments 1-3. The star and heart balloons are the special 
balloons and the round balloons are the regular balloons. 
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Results and Discussion 
The analyses in all experiments used Generalized Estimating Equations models (GEEs); 
ordinal logistic for happiness ratings and binary logistic for counterfactual questions. In 
experiments on children, age in months was mean-centred and entered as a covariate. Table 2 
lists the factors entered into each model and all significant and marginal effects.  
 We first looked at children’s happiness ratings. There was a significant main effect of 
age, Wald X2(1) = 19.51, p < .001, no main effect of distribution, Wald X2(1) = 1.88, p = .170, 
and a significant age-by-distribution interaction, Wald X2(1) = 12.18, p < .001; see Figure 18. To 
follow up on this interaction, we explored each age group separately and found that 6-year-olds 
rated the girl as significantly happier in the Mostly Regular condition than in the Mostly Special 
condition, Wald X2(1) = 13.34, p < .001. Five-year-olds did not show differences between the 
two conditions, Wald X2(1) = 1.51, p = .218, and 4-year-olds rated the girl as significantly 
happier in the Mostly Special condition than in the Mostly Regular condition, Wald X2(1) = 4.51, 
p = .034. We also explored each condition separately. In the Mostly Special condition, with age, 
children rated the girl as less happy to receive a regular balloon, Wald X2(1) = 26.88, p < .001; in 
the Mostly Regular condition, age did not affect their happiness ratings, Wald X2(1) = 0.63, p = 
.429.  
 Next, we looked at children’s responses to the counterfactual question. There was a 
significant main effect of age, Wald X2(1) = 4.05, p = .044, no main effect of distribution, Wald 
X2(1) = 0.62, p = .431, and a significant age-by-distribution interaction, Wald X2(1) = 4.09, p = 
.043; see Figure 18. We explored each age group separately and found that 4-, 5-, and 6-year-
olds’ responses did not significantly differ between the two conditions, Wald X2(1) = 0.34, p = 
.558, Wald X2(1) = 0.45, p = .503, Wald X2(1) = 2.10, p = .147, respectively. We also explored 
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each condition separately, and found that in the Mostly Regular condition, with age, children 
were less likely to say the girl could have easily gotten a special balloon, Wald X2(1) = 7.69, p = 
.006; in the Mostly Special condition, age did not affect their judgment, Wald X2(1) = 0.00, p = 
.993. 
 At age 4, children inferred that the girl would be happier when she learns that most of the 
remaining boxes contained special balloons. Although seemingly counterintuitive, our youngest 
children may have inferred that the girl is happy because there were overall many special 
balloons – more special balloons means more happiness. Previous studies have reported similar 
findings in older children aged 5 and 7 (Guttentag & Ferrell, 2004; McCloy & Strange, 2007). 
Our older children did not rely on this strategy for their emotion ratings, and by age 6, children 
inferred the girl would feel sadder about winning a regular balloon when she could have easily 
won a more attractive one (i.e., compared with when this counterfactual alternative was not 
close). This finding suggests that children might use counterfactuals to infer others’ emotions 
earlier than previously thought. 
However, when directly asked the counterfactual question, even 6-year-olds were 
insensitive to the difference in closeness between conditions. Perhaps children struggled with our 
specific question. We asked children whether the girl “could have easily” won a special balloon. 
In earlier work showing that 5-year-olds can consider close counterfactuals, children were 
instead asked about whether a counterfactual alternative “almost” happened (Beck & Guthrie, 
2011), which may be easier for them to understand. So in the next experiment, we adopted this 
wording for our counterfactual question. 
We also wondered if younger children would succeed if the chronology of the story was 
changed. Information about the initial odds of winning a special balloon was only provided after 
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it already became evident that this outcome did not occur to reduce the likelihood that children 
could rely on prior beliefs in their emotion judgements. However, this is a somewhat unusual 
sequence of events and young children might find it difficult to follow. We examined these 
possibilities in Experiment 2. That is, we changed the close counterfactual question to be more 
similar to previous child studies and changed the chronology of the story. 
Table 2  
Factors and Effects from each GEE Analysis 
Experiment  Question  Factors  Effects  Wald X2  df  p 
1  happiness  distribution  age  19.51  1  <.001 
age*distribution 12.18 1 <.001 
             
  counterfactual  distribution  age  4.05  1  .044 
age*distribution 4.09 1 .043 
             
2  happiness  distribution  age  12.45  1  <.001 
distribution 2.93 1 .087 
             
  counterfactual  distribution  age  4.55  1  .033 
age*distribution 6.83 1 .009 
             
3  happiness  distribution  distribution  12.23  1  <.001 
             
  counterfactual  distribution  distribution  14.92  1  <.001 
age*distribution 7.59 1 .006 
    question-type  question-type  13.82  1  <.001 
age*question-type 9.92 1 .002 
             
4  happiness  distribution  distribution  72.84  1  <.001 
             
  counterfactual  distribution  distribution  177.77  1  <.001 
    question-type  question-type  3.16  1  .076 
Note. In all experiments, distribution was either Mostly Special or Mostly Regular; in 
Experiments 3 and 4, question-type was either “could the girl have easily gotten” or “did the girl 





Figure 18. Children's happiness ratings (top row) and counterfactual responses (bottom row) in 
Experiments 1-3. Happiness ratings ranged from -3 (extremely sad) to 3 (extremely happy). 
Colored bands show 95% confidence intervals; points are jittered to avoid over-plotting. 
Experiment 2 
 The story was similar to Experiment 1, except children saw the array of balloons at the 
beginning and were told that the girl did not know which balloons were in each box. Also, 
instead of asking whether the girl could have easily gotten a special balloon, we asked whether 
the girl almost got a special balloon. Lastly, because only the oldest children correctly inferred 






 Participants. We tested 125 5-6-year-olds (M = 6;0; range = 5;0 – 6;11; 67 girls); 60 5-
year-olds (M = 5;6; range = 5;0 – 5;11; 39 girls), and 65 6-year-olds (M = 6;5; range = 6;0 – 
6;11; 28 girls). Four additional children were tested but excluded for failing the comprehension 
question three times (n = 3) or for having already completed Experiment 1 (n = 1). We aimed to 
test 60 children per between-subjects condition, with equal numbers of children per age-in-years 
randomly assigned to each condition. However, we accidentally tested five extra 6-year-olds. 
Thus, we ended up with 63 children in the Mostly Special condition and 62 children in the 
Mostly Regular condition. 
 Materials and procedure. The materials, procedure, and design were similar to those in 
Experiment 1. See Figure 17 for the story and script. In this experiment, however, children saw 
the balloons at the beginning of the story, and were told that the girl did not know which 
balloons were in each box. They were asked a comprehension question to confirm they 
understood this. We also changed the counterfactual question so that it asked whether the girl 
almost got a special balloon. Children were again tested in either the Mostly Special or the 
Mostly Regular condition.  
Results and Discussion 
We first looked at children’s happiness ratings. There was a significant main effect of 
age, Wald X2(1) = 12.45, p < .001, where younger children rated the girl as happier about 
receiving a regular balloon than older children did; see Figure 18. There was no effect of 
distribution, Wald X2(1) = 2.93, p = .087, and no age-by-distribution interaction, Wald X2(1) = 
0.03, p = .857. 
68 
 
 Next, we looked at children’s responses to the counterfactual question. There was a 
significant main effect of age, Wald X2(1) = 4.55, p = .033, no main effect of distribution, Wald 
X2(1) = 2.64, p = .104, and a significant age-by-distribution interaction, Wald X2(1) = 6.83, p = 
.009; see Figure 18. We explored each age group separately and found that 6-year-olds were 
more likely to say the girl almost got a special balloon in the Mostly Regular condition than in 
the Mostly Special condition, Wald X2(1) = 3.99, p = .046, while 5-year-olds’ responses did not 
significantly differ between these conditions, Wald X2(1) = 0.11, p = .739.1  We also explored 
each condition separately. In the Mostly Regular condition, with age, children were more likely 
to say the girl almost got a special balloon, Wald X2(1) = 9.54, p = .002; in the Mostly Special 
condition, age did not affect their judgment, Wald X2(1) = 0.14, p = .707. 
 In sum, children were insensitive to close counterfactuals when inferring emotions, and 
did not appropriately differentiate between conditions when answering the counterfactual 
question. In fact, to the extent that children were sensitive to the difference between conditions 
for the counterfactual question, it was opposite to expectations. Surprisingly, 6-year-olds were 
more likely to say that the girl “almost” got a special balloon when this was less likely. We are 
uncertain about what caused this result, but here is one speculation: Although the regular balloon 
chosen by the girl was next to a special one in both conditions, this might have seemed more 
remarkable or luckier in the condition where there were just a few special balloons. So in that 
condition, the low odds of winning a special balloon might have accentuated the closeness of 
choosing an adjacent balloon.  
 
1 For 6-year-olds, we had to run this follow-up analysis using a negative binomial distribution because using a 
binary logistic distribution led to the Hessian matrix being violated. We observed comparable results when we 
analyzed the data using a Mann-Whitney test (p = .044). 
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Regardless, children’s difficulties in this experiment suggest that rather than benefitting 
children, showing the distribution and locations of balloons in advance hurt their performance. 
Children may have had difficulty suppressing their knowledge of the balloons’ locations when 
inferring the girl’s emotions. If they thought she knew where the balloons were located, they 
might have thought she chose the regular balloon on purpose, which would affect their emotion 
inferences. This difficulty is consistent with findings that children, sometimes including 6-year-
olds, have difficulty ignoring their privileged knowledge when attributing emotions to others 
(Bradmetz & Schneider, 1999; de Rosnay et al., 2004; Harris et al., 1989; Ronfard & Harris, 
2014). 
Alternatively, the finding could be taken to suggest that 6-year-olds’ responses in 
Experiment 1 do not replicate. To address these possibilities, we conducted a further study using 
the original design in which the participant does not know the initial odds of winning a special 
balloon. We attempted to make the task easier for children by providing two cues to the 
closeness of the counterfactual alternative of winning a special balloon. In addition to 
manipulating probability across the two conditions, we also manipulated spatial proximity. This 
next experiment also used both close counterfactual questions – half the children were asked 
whether the girl could have easily gotten a special balloon and the other half were asked whether 
the girl almost got a special balloon. 
Experiment 3 
 Children saw a character choose one of ten closed boxes and learn the distribution of the 
balloons after she had already won a regular one. In this experiment, we also manipulated the 
position of the special and regular balloons. In the Mostly Special condition, the girl had a high 
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chance and was physically very close to winning a special balloon. In the Mostly Regular 
condition, the girl had a low chance and was physically far from winning a special balloon. 
Methods 
 Participants. We tested 120 5-6-year-olds (M = 5;11; range = 5;0 – 6;11; 55 girls). There 
were 60 5-year-olds (M = 5;4; range = 5;0 – 5;11; 27 girls), and 60 6-year-olds (M = 6;6; range = 
6;0 – 6;11; 28 girls), with equal numbers of children per age-in-years randomly assigned to each 
between-subjects condition. 
 Materials and procedure. The experiment used a 2 x 2 design in which distribution 
(Mostly Special, Mostly Regular) was manipulated within subjects (order counterbalanced across 
children) and question-type (easily, almost) was manipulated between subjects. Children each 
heard two stories. See Figure 17 for a sample of the stories and script. In both stories, a character 
(girl in story 1, boy in story 2) chose one of ten closed boxes and received a regular balloon. The 
character was then shown the balloons in the remaining boxes, and children were asked how the 
character felt about getting the regular balloon. Next, children were either asked whether the 
character could have easily gotten a special balloon, or whether the character almost got a special 
balloon.  
 The difference between this experiment and the previous experiments is the position of 
each balloon in the distribution. In the previous experiments, in both conditions, the regular 
balloon that the girl received was flanked by one regular balloon and one special balloon. In this 
experiment, the regular balloon that the girl received was flanked by two special balloons in the 
Mostly Special condition, and two regular balloons in the Mostly Regular condition. This could 




Results and Discussion 
We first looked at children’s happiness ratings. There was a significant main effect of 
distribution, Wald X2(1) = 12.23, p < .001, where children rated the character as happier about 
receiving a regular balloon in the Mostly Regular condition than in the Mostly Special condition; 
see Figure 18. There was no main effect of age, Wald X2(1) = 0.78, p = .376, and no age-by-
distribution interaction, Wald X2(1) = 0.78, p = .376. 
 Next, we looked at children’s responses to the counterfactual questions; see Figure 18. 
There was a significant main effect of distribution, Wald X2(1) = 14.92, p < .001, as children 
were overall more likely to say “yes” in the Mostly Special condition than in the Mostly Regular 
condition (i.e., said the character could have easily gotten or almost got the special balloon), but 
no main effect of age, Wald X2(1) = 0.002, p = .969. There was also a significant age-by-
distribution interaction, Wald X2(1) = 7.59, p = .006. This resulted from 6-year-olds being more 
likely to say “yes” in the Mostly Special condition than in the Mostly Regular condition, Wald 
X2(1) = 15.22, p < .001, and 5-year-olds not responding differently between the two conditions, 
Wald X2(1) = 1.97, p = .161. Also, in the Mostly Regular condition, with age, children were 
marginally less likely to say “yes”, Wald X2(1) = 3.70, p = .054; in the Mostly Special condition, 
age did not affect their judgment, Wald X2(1) = 0.04, p = .834. 
Further, there was a significant main effect of question-type, Wald X2(1) = 13.82, p < 
.001, where children were overall more likely to say “yes” when asked whether the character 
almost got a special balloon. Although we collapsed across question-type when showing these 
results in Figure 18, we show the results split by question-type in Appendix A. There was also a 
significant age-by-question-type interaction, Wald X2(1) = 9.92, p = .002. This resulted because 
6-year-olds were more likely to say “yes” when asked whether the character almost got a special 
72 
 
balloon than when asked whether the character could have easily gotten a special balloon, Wald 
X2(1) = 19.89, p < .001, whereas 5-year-olds’ responses did not differ between the two question-
types, Wald X2(1) = 0.81, p = .369. Also, when asked about whether the character could have 
easily gotten a special balloon, with age, children were less likely to say “yes”, Wald X2(1) = 
5.14, p = .023; when asked about whether the character almost got a special balloon, age did not 
affect their responses, Wald X2(1) = 2.57, p = .109. Because these analyses do not involve 
distribution, our main factor of interest, we do not discuss them further. 
Finally, we looked at whether children’s responses to the counterfactual questions 
corresponded with their happiness ratings. If children reason about close counterfactuals, they 
should judge that the girl almost (or could have easily) received a special balloon in the Mostly 
Special condition, but not in the Mostly Regular condition. Overall, 25 children showed this 
pattern, and 95 did not. We used a GEE model (ordinal logistic) to test whether this pattern of 
responding predicted whether children gave more positive emotion ratings in the Mostly Regular 
condition than in the Mostly Special condition. The model included distribution (Mostly Special, 
Mostly Regular) and whether children showed this pattern of close-counterfactual reasoning as 
factors. There was a significant main effect of distribution, Wald X2(1) = 4.89, p = .027, and no 
main effect of pattern-type, Wald X2(1) = 3.45, p = .063. There was also no distribution-by-
pattern-type interaction, Wald X2(1) = 0.85, p = .357, suggesting that children’s happiness ratings 
did not differ based on how they responded to the counterfactual questions.  
In sum, both 5- and 6-year-olds inferred the girl would feel sadder about winning a 
regular balloon in the condition where she was closer to winning a better one. Further, 6-year-
olds also responded correctly to the close counterfactual questions. However, children’s success 
in inferring emotions did not depend on their success in close counterfactual reasoning, 
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suggesting that they may not use close counterfactuals to infer emotions. This raises the concern 
that even adults’ close counterfactual reasoning might not correspond with their emotion 
predictions. We assessed this possibility in our final experiment. 
Experiment 4 
 We tested adults using a similar design to Experiment 3. Our goal was to have a reference 
point with which to compare children’s responses and to address the concern that previous 
studies on adults confounded close counterfactuals with prior beliefs (e.g., Mellers et al., 1997; 
van Dijk & van der Pligt, 1997). 
Methods 
 Preregistration. This experiment was preregistered at 
https://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=829yz4. The preregistration covered the number of 
participants, design, and analysis plan. 
Participants. The experiment was successfully completed by 227 adults (mean age = 35 
years; 74 females) recruited using Amazon Mechanical Turk. Participants received $0.75 USD 
for their participation. We originally had 302 participants, but as per our preregistration, we 
excluded those who failed at least one of our two comprehension check questions or neglected to 
answer any of the test questions (n = 75). 
 Materials and procedure. The experiment used the same 2 x 2 design as Experiment 3: 
distribution (Mostly Special, Mostly Regular) was manipulated within subjects, and question-
type (easily, almost) was manipulated between subjects. The stories were similar to those in 
Experiment 3, except the language of the script was changed to be more suitable for adults. The 
first page showed a girl in front of two balloons with the script, “Here’s a girl. She can win a 
balloon. She might win a regular balloon (left) or she might win a special balloon (right)”. The 
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second page showed the girl in front of ten closed boxes with the script, “The girl gets to choose 
a box and she’ll win whichever balloon is in the box she chooses”. The third page showed the 
girl receiving a regular balloon with the script, “The girl chooses this box and wins this balloon. 
Let’s show the girl what balloons are in the other boxes”. The fourth page showed the remaining 
balloons. The test question (“When the girl sees this, how does she feel about the balloon she 
won?”) appeared beneath the image, along with the same happy face scale used with children. 
Participants responded by clicking on one of the faces. Participants then saw a story about a boy 
with the other distribution. The counterfactual question for both stories was asked after 
participants had already seen and made happiness judgments for both distributions (e.g., “Here’s 
the girl and all of the balloons again. Could the girl have easily won a special balloon?” or 
“Here’s the girl and all of the balloons again. Did the girl almost win a special balloon?”). We 
left these counterfactual questions for the end of the procedure (i.e., rather than asking a 
counterfactual question after each story) because we were concerned that asking the 
counterfactual question after the first story might affect how adults approached the emotion 
judgment in the second story. 
Results and Discussion 
We first looked at adults’ happiness ratings. There was a significant main effect of 
distribution, Wald X2(1) = 72.84, p < .001, where they rated the character as happier about 
receiving a regular balloon in the Mostly Regular condition (M = 0.28; SD = 1.38) than in the 
Mostly Special condition (M = -1.12; SD = 1.89).  
Next, we looked at adults’ responses to the counterfactual questions. There was a 
significant main effect of distribution, Wald X2(1) = 177.77, p < .001, where they were more 
likely to respond “yes” in the Mostly Special condition (i.e., said the character could have easily 
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gotten or almost got the special balloon). There was no main effect of question-type, Wald X2(1) 
= 3.16, p = .076, and no distribution-by-question-type interaction, Wald X2(1) = 1.09, p = .296. 
Finally, we looked at how adults’ responses to the counterfactual questions corresponded 
with their happiness ratings. Responses were coded in the same manner as in Experiment 3. 
Overall, 174 participants showed the expected pattern (“yes” in the Mostly Special condition and 
“no” in the Mostly Regular condition), and 53 did not. We conducted a GEE model (ordinal 
logistic) with distribution and pattern-type entered into the model as factors. There was a 
significant main effect of distribution, Wald X2(1) = 30.73, p < .001, a significant main effect of 
pattern-type, Wald X2(1) = 14.13, p < .001, and a distribution-by-pattern-type interaction, Wald 
X2(1) = 13.67, p < .001. Participants who responded both “yes” in the Mostly Special condition 
and “no” in the Mostly Regular condition rated the character as happier about receiving a regular 
balloon in the Mostly Regular condition than in the Mostly Special condition, Wald X2(1) = 
82.12, p < .001. Participants who responded to the counterfactual questions in any other way 
showed no differences in happiness ratings between the two conditions, Wald X2(1) = 1.43, p = 
.231.2 Unlike children, adults’ emotion ratings corresponded with their close counterfactual 
responses, suggesting that they consider close counterfactual alternatives when inferring 
emotions. 
General Discussion 
 We investigated young children’s ability to consider close counterfactual alternatives 
when inferring other people’s emotions. We first examined counterfactual closeness in 
connection with probability and found that 6-year-olds (but not younger children) recognized 
 
2 In our pre-registration, we reported that we would run the analysis for the happiness ratings using a paired-samples 
t-test (we report GEEs in the main text because they are more appropriate for this ordinal data). The results are 
essentially the same. See Appendix B for the pre-registered analyses. 
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that a person would be less happy about receiving a regular prize when the prior probability of 
receiving a special prize was high rather than low. However, children did not show this 
understanding when they knew the odds of winning a special prize from the outset. We next 
examined counterfactual closeness in connection with probability and spatial proximity 
combined. Now 5- and 6-year-olds, and adults, recognized that the person would be less happy 
about winning a regular prize when the possibility of receiving a special prize was a close 
counterfactual alternative.  
 In each experiment, participants also responded to counterfactual questions about 
whether the alternative outcome of winning a special prize was close or far. In the first two 
experiments, children did not appropriately respond to these questions. They were no more likely 
to say the girl could easily have won a special balloon (or that she almost won one) when the 
prior probability of this alternative outcome was high rather than low. In the final experiments 
(where counterfactual closeness depended on both prior probabilities and spatial proximity), 6-
year-olds (but not 5-year-olds) and adults responded appropriately. But whereas adults’ 
responses to the close counterfactual questions predicted their emotion inferences, 6-year-olds’ 
responses did not.  
Together these findings provide conflicting evidence about whether children consider 
close counterfactuals when inferring emotions. The emotion ratings suggest that by age 5 or 6, 
children do consider close counterfactuals in these inferences – their emotion judgments were 
broadly in line with those of adults in classic studies connecting close counterfactuals and 
emotions (e.g., Johnson, 1986; Mellers et al., 1997; van Dijk & van der Pligt, 1997). At the same 
time, children’s largely poor performance in response to the counterfactual questions provides 
reason to doubt this conclusion. 
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 One interpretation of the findings, then, is that children did not use close counterfactuals 
to infer emotions. To be viable, though, this account needs to specify how else children could 
have made these inferences. We do not see a plausible alternative. For example, it might seem 
that children could have inferred the girl’s emotions by considering her prior beliefs and 
expectations (e.g., Asaba et al., 2019; Lara et al., 2019; Wellman & Bartsch, 1988; also see Wu 
& Schulz, 2018). But this is unlikely because in Experiments 1 and 3, children had no 
information about the girl’s prior beliefs (i.e., the distribution of balloons was revealed after the 
girl had already won a regular one).3 It might also seem that children could have inferred 
emotions by using the distribution of balloons as a standard of comparison (Cadotte et al., 1987; 
also see Doan et al., 2020). For example, when most balloons are special, winning a special 
balloon may be viewed as the standard outcome. Receiving a regular balloon is disappointing 
because it falls short of this standard. But this explanation cannot explain why children’s 
judgments should be sensitive to the spatial arrangements of the regular and special balloons, and 
it appears that children were sensitive to this factor (i.e., 5-year-olds performed better when 
counterfactual closeness depended on spatial proximity and probability together, compared with 
when it depended on probability alone).  
We instead favour an account holding that children do use close counterfactuals to infer 
emotions, but that our participants had difficulty understanding and responding to the 
counterfactual questions. Several factors could have contributed to this difficulty. For example, 
the “easily could have” question is somewhat figurative, and children might have had difficulty 
understanding it; no previous research had used this question with children. Previous work has 
 
3 Further, the findings from Experiment 2 suggest that information about prior beliefs interfered with performance. 
When children saw the distribution and locations of the balloons at the beginning, they had difficulty ignoring their 
privileged knowledge and did not rate the girl’s emotions differently between conditions (for related findings, see 
Bradmetz & Schneider, 1999; de Rosnay et al., 2004; Harris et al., 1989; Ronfard & Harris, 2014). 
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found that 5-year-olds do understand counterfactual questions about what “almost happened” 
(Beck & Guthrie, 2011). But children might need to see contrasting events to successfully 
answer this kind of question. In Beck and Guthrie’s experiments, after seeing two toy horses 
galloping along a table, 5-year-olds said the one who stopped right at the edge almost fell, as 
compared to either one that fell or one that did not come close to falling (Beck & Guthrie, 2011). 
Perhaps children needed to compare the horse who stopped at the edge with one who fell or did 
not come close to falling in order to determine which one almost fell. Finally, our participants 
may have struggled with the way our questions were ordered. Perhaps they would have found the 
counterfactual questions easier if these had been asked immediately after the scenario, and not 
after questions about the girl’s emotion. 
Our primary interest in conducting this research was examining children’s use of close 
counterfactuals when inferring emotions. As discussed, though, counterfactual closeness depends 
on many factors, including probability, spatial proximity, and numerical proximity. Our first 
experiments manipulated closeness via probability alone, and our later experiments manipulated 
it alongside spatial proximity. Differences between children’s responses in Experiments 1 and 3 
suggest that children could be more sensitive to spatial proximity than probability as a cue to 
counterfactual closeness, and that spatial proximity may precede probability as a cue to 
counterfactual closeness. However, these conclusions are tentative at best. Adequately 
investigating it will require a single experiment that separately manipulates both factors (i.e., 
rather than making informal comparisons across experiments). It is also possible that future 
research might reveal deeper differences between these determinants of counterfactual closeness. 
Indeed, it is even possible that probability-based and spatially-based closeness could turn out to 
be different kinds of counterfactual closeness. Returning to our counterfactual questions, while it 
79 
 
might be appropriate to say that an outcome with a high prior probability could have easily 
happened, it might be less appropriate to say it almost or nearly happened.  
In summary, we found that by age 5 or 6, children recognize that another person will be 
sadder about an outcome if a better outcome could easily have occurred, rather than if a better 
outcome could not have easily occurred. These emotion judgments contrast with children’s 
judgments in earlier work, which suggested that before age 7, children do not consider 
counterfactual possibilities when inferring emotions (e.g., Amsel & Smalley, 2000; Beck & 
Crilly, 2009; Guttentag & Ferrell, 2004). In our experiments, children largely had difficulty 
assessing whether the better outcome was a close counterfactual, even when they were successful 
in these emotion inferences. Although further work is needed, we suspect that difficulty 






Chapter Five: General Discussion 
Summary of Findings 
 In 13 experiments, I examined the development of children’s (and adults’) ability to 
consider probability when making emotion inferences. Chapter Two investigated children’s use 
of probabilistic information when inferring other people’s surprise. Through four experiments, I 
found development in children’s ability to use probability to infer surprise. At age 5 and under, 
children do not use probability to infer surprise. At age 6, children have a limited ability to use 
probability to infer surprise, such that they require prompts regarding probability (but not beliefs) 
in order to consistently use it to infer surprise. It is only at age 7 that children have a robust 
understanding of the connection between probability and surprise. These findings are the first to 
show that children consider probability when attributing surprise to others. They also 
demonstrate that children’s understanding of surprise is not just belief-based, but also 
probability-based. 
 Chapter Three investigated children’s use of probabilistic information when inferring the 
quality of outcomes and other people’s happiness. Through four experiments, I found a lag 
between children’s ability to use probability to infer outcome quality and their ability to use 
probability to infer happiness. By age 4, children understand that the quality of an outcome is 
influenced by whether a better outcome was initially more likely. However, it is not until age 5 
that children understand that people’s happiness with an outcome is also dependent on the 
likelihood of a better outcome. A fifth experiment showed that adults use probability to assess 
both quality and happiness. These findings are the first to show that children consider probability 
when inferring others’ happiness. 
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 Chapter Four investigated children’s use of close counterfactual alternatives (manipulated 
through probability) when inferring other people’s happiness. Through three experiments, I 
found development in children’s ability to consider the closeness of alternative outcomes to infer 
happiness. At age 6, children recognize that people’s happiness with an outcome is dependent on 
whether a better outcome was initially more likely. Children recognize this at age 5 if the better 
outcome was both initially more likely and physically close to the person. Further, at age 6, 
children acknowledge that winning a better prize was a likely counterfactual alternative when the 
better prize was more likely and physically close, however their close counterfactual reasoning 
do not predict their emotion inferences. A fourth experiment showed that adults’ close 
counterfactual reasoning predicts their emotion inferences. These findings are the first to show 
how close counterfactual alternatives, manipulated through probability, influences children’s 
happiness inferences. 
 The findings from these three chapters provide the first evidence that children use 
probability to infer other people’s emotions. They also provide a developmental view of when 
children integrate their understanding of probability with their understanding of emotions. In the 
remainder of this chapter, I discuss how the findings from my research (do not) fit into the 
current accounts of how children infer emotions, and theorize about how children might be using 
probability to infer emotions. I also discuss the inconsistencies of the statistical analyses between 
my chapters, and the limitations of my work and possible future directions. 
Beyond Current Accounts of Children’s Emotion Understanding 
The findings of my dissertation contrast with existing accounts of how children infer 
others’ emotions. One major account proposes that children infer emotions by learning and 
memorizing scripts (e.g., Widen & Russell, 2010, 2011; also see Fehr & Russell, 1984). My 
82 
 
findings are not easily handled by script theory. Scripts are composed of specific and concrete 
events (e.g., Abelson, 1981; Fehr & Russell, 1984; Schank & Abelson, 1975), meaning that 
scripts do not include general and abstract notions (Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997). However, 
probabilities are not specific events, and the notion of probability is abstract rather than concrete. 
For example, although it might be easy to depict or visualize specific high probability (or low 
probability) events, there is no way to do this for the abstract notion of being highly probable. So 
probability likely does not enter into scripts.  
One might posit, though, that script theory could be adapted or extended to include 
abstract and general concepts like probability. For example, one could propose that children’s 
script for surprise could be something like, “when unlikely events occur, people are surprised”.  
However, this is better described as a folk or naïve theory of surprise, given that these knowledge 
structures are not limited to specific events, and instead typically reference abstract and non-
obvious concepts (e.g., Gelman & Noles, 2011). So suggesting that scripts can include abstract 
concepts like probabilities would collapse the distinction between scripts and other kinds of 
knowledge structures. This revision to the script theory of emotions would also render the theory 
unfalsifiable and empty. If scripts can include any information useful for inferring emotions, then 
no matter what information children use, the script theory is supported.  
Another major account suggests that children infer emotions by drawing on their “theory 
of mind” and considering others’ mental states, like their desires and beliefs (e.g., Harris, 2008; 
Rieffe et al., 2005; Wellman & Banerjee, 1991). My findings also do not fit directly with this 
account. When people reason about probability, they do not need to consider mental states. For 
example, you can conclude that someone who is at a gumball machine with many purple 
gumballs and few red gumballs is unlikely to get a red one without considering their beliefs or 
83 
 
desires about what they would receive before the outcome occurs. Further, probabilistic 
information is often enough to allow us to infer emotions. The knowledge that the person is 
unlikely to receive a red gumball is enough to allow us to infer that they will be surprised if they 
get one. 
However, it could seem that this inference requires us to also consider their beliefs or 
knowledge. For example, it might seem that we inferred their surprise by reasoning as follows: 
They know they are unlikely to get a red gumball, so they believe they will not get one; 
therefore, they are surprised when they do get one. We could infer surprise in this way. However, 
my findings from Chapter Two suggests that children are not inferring surprise in this way. 
Experiments 3 and 4, in which children were provided with a probability, belief, or control 
prompt, show that children do not need to consider other people’s beliefs to infer their surprise. 
In fact, I found that prompting children to consider beliefs did not improve their surprise 
inferences, but prompting them to consider probability did. As such, in cases like this, 
probability information is sufficient to infer surprise. 
One might wonder whether children consider mental states when inferring happiness. In 
Chapters Three and Four, children must of course consider the girl’s desires when inferring her 
happiness. But children might also have considered her beliefs. For example, in Chapter Three, 
when the gumball machine contained mostly yummy gumballs, children might have reasoned 
that the girl was somewhat disappointed to get equal numbers of yummy and yucky gumballs 
because she had believed she would get mostly yummy ones. On this account, children may have 
used probabilistic reasoning to infer the girl’s belief about what she would receive, but then used 
this belief attribution (instead of the probability information) to infer her emotion. That is, 
because there are many yummy gumballs, the girl believed she would get mostly yummy ones, 
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and because she believed she would get mostly yummy ones, she is disappointed when she does 
not. As such, children might have made their happiness judgments based on the girl’s beliefs. 
Chapter Four allowed me to examine this possibility more closely. Children saw a girl choose 
one of ten closed boxes and receive a regular balloon. In one condition, the girl later learned that 
most of the other boxes contained regular balloons, while in another condition, she learned that 
most of them held special balloons. If children’s inferences of happiness are belief-based, then 
their happiness rating should not differ across these two conditions – when the girl chose a box, 
she was unaware of the distribution of regular and special balloons, and so her prior beliefs about 
what she would receive could not differ by condition. However, children’s happiness judgments 
did vary across the two conditions in Experiments 1 and 3. They judged that the girl was happy 
with the regular balloon she received when most of the other balloons were regular, but they 
judged she felt sad about it when most of the other balloons were special. This pattern shows that 
children consider probability when inferring others’ happiness, as they judged that the girl was 
happier when she discovered (after-the-fact) that she had had a low chance of getting a special 
balloon. So, although people may sometimes consider people’s belief-based mental states 
alongside probability when inferring emotions, it is not always necessary – considering 
probability by itself is often enough. 
Together, my findings suggest that the dominant accounts of how children infer emotions 
do not suffice in accounting for the different ways in which children can infer emotions. 
Specifically, they cannot accommodate the findings that children use probability to infer other 
people’s emotions. Children’s use of probability shows that they can infer emotions by 
considering abstract concepts from outside the domain of theory of mind. This conclusion is also 
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supported by research showing that children infer emotions by drawing on their understanding of 
ownership (Pesowski & Friedman, 2015).  
This raises the question of what a theory of emotion should entail. Research in social 
cognition has shown that computational Bayesian models can be applied to people’s inferences 
about the social world (e.g., Baker et al., 2017; Jara-Ettinger et al., 2016; Jern & Kemp, 2015). 
Recent work has applied these computational cognitive modeling approaches to specifically 
model people’s understanding of emotions (e.g., Ong et al., 2015; Wu et al., 2018; see Ong et al., 
2019 for a review). An intuitive theory of emotion has been proposed to unify various lay 
reasoning about emotions into one cohesive framework. Much like how we use multiple senses 
(e.g., sight, smell, touch) to understand our physical world, we can draw on a variety of cues 
from the environment and from people when inferring emotions. For example, we can integrate 
information about the outcome itself, the person’s mental states, and the person’s facial 
expressions to infer their emotion. An intuitive model of emotion allows for this integration and 
does not assume a priori that one cue would be weighted more heavily than another – the model 
assumes that people are sensitive to the reliability of each cue in certain contexts and allows for 
differing weights of each cue depending on the context (Ong et al., 2019). I propose that 
information about probability and statistics can also be integrated into this model such that we 
can use information about probability in addition to the other cues and factors to infer emotions. 
As I have shown in the previous three chapters, information about probability can be highly 
relevant and is used in both children’s and adults’ inferences of emotions. Further, there are 
instances where probability information may be more relevant than information about mental 
states. That said, when multiple cues are available, I suspect that how we weigh probability 
information in comparison to other cues is highly dependent on past experiences and the 
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situational context. Overall, the intuitive theory framework for studying how people reason about 
emotions may be the much needed bridge that connects our lay reasoning about emotions 
together. 
How do Children use Probability to Infer Emotions? 
Perhaps the most important question raised by this work is how children use probability 
to infer emotions. One explanation is that these inferences depend on theory-like generalizations 
connecting probability with different emotions. This account may be plausible for children’s 
inferences of surprise, as they could depend on a simple and intuitive generalization like people 
are surprised when improbable events happen. However, it is harder to see how theory-like 
generalizations could support children’s inferences of happiness, as this would require children 
to use less intuitive generalizations like people’s happiness about positive outcomes increases as 
the likelihood of the outcomes decreases. In fact, this generalization is unlikely to explain 
children’s responses in my research, as they involved outcomes that were not clearly positive or 
negative (e.g., receiving two yummy gumballs and two yucky ones). 
However, children’s probability-based assessments of happiness could depend on 
generalizations nonetheless. Children might reason according to the intuitive generalization that 
more positive outcomes increase people’s happiness (and more negative outcomes decrease it). 
This generalization does not involve probability. However, it does require children to think about 
the extent to which outcomes are positive or negative, and children can accomplish this through 
probabilistic reasoning. Children might have engaged in this process in Chapters Three and Four. 
For example, in Chapter Three, children could assess that receiving two yummy and two yucky 
gumballs is bad (or unlucky) if they came from a gumball machine that contained mostly yummy 
gumballs. Then, because the outcome is considered bad, children would infer that the girl who 
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received this outcome is sad. Similarly, in Chapter Four, after the distribution of balloons were 
revealed, children could assess that getting a regular balloon is bad when most of the other boxes 
contained special balloons, thus inferring the girl is sad. As such, inferences of happiness or 
sadness might require two steps: (1) use probability to assess the quality of the outcome, and (2) 
use the quality of the outcome to infer happiness. My findings from Chapter Three demonstrate 
that children can use probability to assess the quality of an outcome by age 4, but do not use it to 
infer happiness until age 5. It is possible that when inferring happiness, 4-year-olds do not 
spontaneously do the first step, thus they are unable to successfully infer happiness and sadness. 
If children infer emotions in the way that I have proposed, it would suggest that there are 
different paths by which probability enters into children’s inferences of others’ emotions. To 
infer surprise, children may need to represent generalizations like improbable events are 
surprising, which directly link the conceptual domains of emotion and probability. Younger 
children may actually struggle with this direct link. However, to infer happiness from 
probability, children might not need to directly link these domains. Thus, there might be a direct 
path for inferences of surprise (probability information → surprise), and an indirect path for 
inferences of happiness (probability information → quality → happiness). And even though 
inferring happiness from probability might take more steps than inferring surprise from 
probability, these steps are arguably simpler, allowing children to infer happiness at a younger 
age. 
Consistency of Analyses 
There is inconsistency in the statistical analyses that I conducted between each chapter of 
my dissertation (i.e., GEEs in Chapters Two and Four and ANOVAs in Chapter Three, age in 
years in Chapters Two and Three and age in months in Chapter Four). My dissertation consists 
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of three published or under review manuscripts and the analyses in each paper are a reflection of 
the statistical tests that I was aware of at the time the manuscripts were submitted. However, 
throughout my PhD, the conventions for analyzing data have begun to shift and I have learned 
new analyses that may be more appropriate for the type of data that is in my dissertation. Thus, 
in Appendix C, I have re-analyzed my data for Chapters Two and Three so that my statistical 
analyses are consistent across the three chapters and are in accord with the current standards. 
Specifically, I conducted GEEs for all analyses and treated age as a continuous co-variate (age in 
months). I conducted GEEs because unlike ANOVAs, GEEs can deal with categorical dependent 
variables, like the forced-choice binary and ordinal responses that I have. Further, analyzing the 
data with children’s age in months allows me to examine the developmental changes as a 
continuum as opposed to observing differences between each age in years. This is a more 
sensitive test and better represents the samples of children in my experiments, given that all 
experiments included continuous age ranges, rather than discontinuous years (i.e., I generally 
tested 4 – 6 year olds and not something like a group of 4-year-olds, a group of 7-year-olds and a 
group of 10-year-olds). The findings from these new analyses are fairly consistent with the 
original analyses. Thus, the interpretation of my findings in the dissertation do not change. The 
consistency of the results between the two different analyses also increase my confidence in the 
robustness of the effects. 
Limitations 
One limitation of my dissertation is that I have yet to nail down the exact mechanism in 
which children are using probability to infer emotions. I have proposed that there might be 
different pathways for inferences of surprise and happiness, but I have not tested these 
possibilities directly. In the future, I can test my proposed pathway for happiness inferences by 
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conducting prompting studies. That is, if children first consider probability to infer the quality of 
an outcome, and then use the quality of the outcome to infer happiness, then prompting children 
to consider outcome quality before they make their emotion judgment should improve their 
happiness inferences. Relatedly, if children assess the extent to which an outcome is positive or 
negative by considering the likelihood of better or worse outcomes, then this suggests that they 
might consider counterfactual possibilities or use probability as a standard of comparison. 
However, my findings from Chapter Four provides mixed evidence and cannot speak to the exact 
mechanism. Further, it is possible that different mechanisms are at play in different situations. As 
such, much more work is required to determine how children are making these inferences. 
Another limitation is that in all experiments, I tested participants from a Western, 
educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic (WEIRD; Henrich et al., 2010) society. As such, 
we must not assume that these results would generalize to non-WEIRD populations. Also, most 
of my experiments used similar stimuli involving gumball machines. In choosing gumball 
machines, I anticipated that children would be familiar with their probabilistic nature. However, 
it is uncertain whether my findings would replicate using other kinds of probabilistic stimuli 
(e.g., spinners, dice). 
Future Directions 
The current findings provide the first evidence that children use probability to infer other 
people’s emotions. While these findings broaden our understanding of children’s conceptions of 
emotion, much future work is needed in order to capture the whole picture. In this section, I 
discuss some possible future directions. 
To fully understand the connection between probability and emotions, children should be 
able to reason flexibly back and forth between the two concepts. That is, not only should children 
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be able to use probability to infer emotions, they should also be able to make “backward” 
inferences about the probabilistic context based on emotions. Follow-up work could examine this 
question directly. For example, one could show children a girl holding a red gumball, standing 
between two gumball machines. One machine has many red gumballs and few purple ones, and 
the other machine has many purple gumballs and few red ones. When told that the girl is very 
surprised that she got a red gumball, will children infer that the girl got her gumball from the 
machine with fewer red ones? We could also ask a similar question regarding disappointment. 
One could show children a girl holding two red yummy and two black yucky gumballs, standing 
between two gumball machines. One machine has many yummy gumballs and few yucky ones, 
and the other machine has many yucky gumballs and few yummy ones. When told that the girl is 
very disappointed about the outcome, will children infer that she got her gumballs from the 
machine with mostly yummy gumballs? Examining these questions will allow us to better 
understand how children’s understandings of probability and emotion influence each other. 
Furthermore, to fully understand the connection between probability and emotions, we 
must examine various emotions. In my dissertation, I focused only on children’s inferences of 
surprise and happiness/sadness. However, probability affects other emotions. For example, in 
contests involving skill, we may feel prouder of winning when our odds of winning are very low, 
and we might likewise feel more ashamed of losing if our success seemed all but guaranteed. 
Probability also affects fear. For example, people worry more about a dangerous or negative 
outcome when they believe it is more probable (e.g., Baron et al., 2000; Peters et al., 2006). The 
relation between fear and probability is complicated, though, as people’s assessments of the 
likelihoods of some events are wildly inaccurate and fearing an event can make people overlook 
the fact that the likelihood of it occurring is low (e.g., Sunstein 2002, 2003). Nevertheless, the 
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effects of probability on emotions like pride, shame, and fear raises the possibility that children 
might infer these emotions by considering probability. 
Future research should also aim at uncovering strategies that may improve children’s 
emotion inferences. The findings from Chapter Two (Experiments 3 and 4) suggest that 
prompting children to consider probability is one way to improve their surprise inferences. This 
may also be true for other emotion inferences. Before children are asked to make their emotion 
inferences regarding a particular outcome, they could be asked to consider whether the chance of 
that outcome occurring is high or low. If these prompting strategies improve children’s emotion 
inferences, it would suggest that they just need reminders to consider probability. Follow-up 
work could investigate whether training paradigms or interventions aimed at improving 
children’s probabilistic reasoning would also improve their emotion inferences. That is, if 
children are taught to consider probability in their daily lives, they might come to spontaneously 
use it when inferring emotions. 
Conclusions 
 Overall, my dissertation provides novel insights into children’s emotion understanding. 
My findings show development in children’s ability to integrate probabilistic information into 
their various emotion inferences. At age 4, children use probability to infer the quality of 
outcomes; at age 5, they use probability to infer other people’s happiness; at age 6, they use 
probability to infer other people’s surprise when prompted; and at age 7, they spontaneously use 
probability to infer surprise. These findings broaden our understanding of children’s conceptions 
of emotions by revealing another way in which children can infer other people’s emotions. These 
findings are also informative about children’s probabilistic reasoning and how they use 
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Analyses according to pre-registration for Experiment 4 (Chapter Four) 
In our pre-registration, we reported that we would run the analysis for the happiness 
ratings using a paired-samples t-test (we report GEEs in the main text because they are more 
appropriate for this ordinal data). Consistent with the GEE, adults rated the character as happier 
about receiving a regular balloon in the Mostly Regular condition than in the Mostly Special 
condition, t(226) = 9.38, p < .001. We also reported that in order to look at how adults’ responses 
to the counterfactual questions corresponded with their happiness ratings, we would conduct a 
2X2 ANOVA with distribution as the within-subjects factor and pattern-type as the between-
subjects factor. As with the GEE, we found a main effect of distribution, F(1,225) = 38.38, p < 
.001, a main effect of pattern-type, F(1,225) = 13.84, p < .001, and a distribution-by-pattern-type 
interaction, F(1,225) = 13.47, p < .001. We followed-up with t-tests. Participants who responded 
both “yes” in the Mostly Special condition and “no” in the Mostly Regular condition rated the 
character as being happier about receiving a regular balloon in the Mostly Regular condition than 
in the Mostly Special condition, t(173) = 10.68, p < .001. Participants who responded to the 
counterfactual questions in any other way showed no differences in happiness ratings between 





Chapter Two New Analyses 
Experiment 1 
A Generalized Estimating Equations (GEE) binary logistic regression with age in months 
mean-centred and entered as a covariate revealed a significant main effect of age, Wald X2(1) = 
10.68, p = .001. Pairwise comparisons revealed that 4-year-olds gave significantly fewer correct 
responses compared to children at all other ages, ps ≤ .019. However, responses did not 
significantly differ between 5-, 6-, and 7-year-olds, ps ≥ .214. Tests against chance revealed that 
7-year-olds predominantly chose the correct character (M = 1.43, SD = .817), p =.010, 6-year-
olds showed a trend in this direction (M = 1.27, SD = .785), p =.072, 5-year-olds responded at 
chance (M = 1.17, SD = .874), p =.297, and 4-year-olds predominantly chose the wrong character 
(M = 0.67, SD = .802), p =.032. These analyses are consistent with the original analyses in which 
age was binned into years. 
Experiment 2 
A GEE binary logistic regression with age in months mean-centred and entered as a 
covariate and condition (impossible, improbable) as a between-subject factor revealed a marginal 
effect of age, Wald X2(1) = 3.63, p = .057. There was no effect of condition, Wald X2(1) = 2.23, p 
= .135, and no age by condition interaction, Wald X2(1) = 0.21, p = .647. Pairwise comparisons 
revealed that 6-year-olds performed significantly better than 4-year-olds, p =.006, and 5-year-
olds, p =.038, but 4-year-olds and 5-year-olds did not differ in their performance, p = .635. Tests 
against chance revealed that 6-year-olds (M = 1.33, SD = .764) predominantly chose the correct 
character, p =.011, whereas, 4-year-olds (M = 0.90, SD = .632), p = .314, and 5-year-olds (M = 
0.98, SD = .768), p = .835, performed at chance. In the original analysis, when age was binned 
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into years, there was a significant main effect of age, however, it is now marginal. Follow-up 
tests revealed that the findings are consistent with the original analyses. 
Experiment 3 
A GEE binary logistic regression with age in months mean-centred and entered as a 
covariate and condition (belief, probability, control) as a between-subject factor revealed a 
significant effect of age, Wald X2(1) = 4.63, p = .031 (6-year-olds chose the correct character 
more often than 5-year-olds), a marginally significant effect of condition, Wald X2(2) = 5.44, p = 
.066, and no age by condition interaction, Wald X2(2) = 4.21, p = .122. Pairwise comparisons 
revealed that children in the probability prompt condition performed significantly better than 
children in the control prompt condition, p = .012, but no differences were found between 
children’s performance in the belief and control prompt conditions, p = .796. Children’s 
performance in the probability prompt condition was also significantly better than their 
performance in the belief prompt condition, p = .040. Tests against chance revealed that only 6-
year-olds performed above chance levels, p = .003. In the original analyses when age was binned 
into years, all main effects and interaction were marginal. The lack of interaction in these new 
analyses suggest that 5- and 6-year-olds might not differ much in their ratings between 
conditions.   
Experiment 4 
The analyses for this experiment would be the same as reported in Chapter Two as I only 
tested one age range (6-year-olds) so age would not be entered into the model. However, I also 
analyzed this data with age in months in case there were developmental differences within the 
span of one year. A GEE binary logistic regression with age in months mean-centred and entered 
as a covariate and condition (belief, probability, control) as a between-subject factor revealed a 
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significant effect of condition, Wald X2(2) = 9.46, p = .009, no effect of age, Wald X2(1) = 1.43, p 
= .232, and no age by condition interaction, Wald X2(2) = 0.21, p = .901. Pairwise comparisons 
revealed that children in the probability prompt condition (M = 1.20, SD = .951), attributed 
surprise to the character significantly more than children in the control prompt condition (M = 
0.35, SD = .671), p = .001, but no differences were found between children’s performance in the 
belief (M = 0.65, SD = .875) and control prompt conditions, p = .212. Children in the probability 
prompt condition also attributed surprise to the character marginally more than children in the 
belief prompt condition, p = .051.Tests against chance revealed that only children in the 
probability prompt condition chose surprise at above chance levels, with chance being 0.50 out 
of 2, as there were four possible emotions to choose from and two trials, p = .007. These new 
findings are consistent with the original findings. 
Chapter Three New Analyses 
Experiment 1 
A GEE ordinal logistic regression with age in months mean-centred and entered as a 
covariate and condition (Mostly Yummy, Mostly Yucky) as a between-subject factor revealed a 
significant age by condition interaction, Wald X2(1) = 4.86, p = .027. There was a marginal effect 
of condition, Wald X2(1) = 3.66, p = .056 (children gave higher ratings in the Mostly Yucky 
condition than in the Mostly Yummy condition), and no main effect of age, Wald X2(1) = 2.31, p 
= .129. I explored each age group separately and found that both 5- and 6-year-olds rated the girl 
as significantly happier in the Mostly Yucky condition than in the Mostly Yummy condition, 
Wald X2(1) = 4.01, p = .045, and, Wald X2(1) = 8.97, p = .003, respectively. However, 4-year-
olds did not show differences between the two conditions, Wald X2(1) = 1.27, p = .260. These 




A GEE ordinal logistic regression with age in months mean-centred and entered as a 
covariate and condition (Mostly Yummy, Mostly Yucky, 50/50) as a between-subject factor 
revealed a main effect of condition, Wald X2(2) = 10.49, p = .005, and a main effect of age, Wald 
X2(1) = 4.07, p = .044. However, looking at the effect of age, 5- and 6-year-olds did not differ in 
their ratings, p = .098. There was no age by condition interaction, Wald X2(2) = 0.11, p = .948. 
Follow-up tests revealed that children rated the girl as significantly happier in the Mostly Yucky 
condition than in the Mostly Yummy condition, p = .003, and happier in the 50/50 condition than 
in the Mostly Yummy condition, p = .035. Happiness ratings did not significantly differ between 
the Mostly Yucky and 50/50 conditions, p = .620. The original ANOVA did not reveal a main 
effect of age, however following up on the new analysis suggest that there is no difference 
between ages. Thus, the findings from the new analyses are consistent with the original analyses. 
Experiment 3 
A GEE ordinal logistic regression with age in months mean-centred and entered as a 
covariate and condition (Mostly Yummy, Mostly Yucky) as a between-subject factor revealed a 
main effect of condition, Wald X2(1) = 15.60, p < .001, where children rated the outcome as 
better in the Mostly Yucky condition than in the Mostly Yummy condition. There was no effect 
of age, Wald X2(1) = 2.75, p = .097, and no age by condition interaction, Wald X2(1) = 0.001, p = 
.972. These findings are consistent with the original findings. 
Experiment 4 
A GEE ordinal logistic regression with condition (Mostly Yummy, Mostly Yucky) as a 
within-subject factor and judgment-type (Happiness, Quality) as a between-subject factor 
revealed a condition by judgment-type interaction, Wald X2(1) = 6.99, p = .008. There were no 
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main effects of condition, Wald X2(1) = 2.60, p = .107, or judgment-type, Wald X2(1) = 0.57, p = 
.452. When rating quality, children gave higher ratings in the Mostly Yucky condition than in the 
Mostly Yummy condition, p = .002. However, when judging happiness, there was no significant 
difference between the Mostly Yummy and Mostly Yucky conditions, p = .551. These findings 
are consistent with the original findings. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
